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Does Overvaluation Lead to Bad Mergers?

机译：高估会导致不良合并吗？

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This study tests overvaluation as an explanation for merger and acquisition activity by examining whether insider trading patterns of acquiring firm around acquisition announcements are related to long-term post-acquisition performance, and provides evidence on the consequences of acquisitions motivated by overvaluation. My findings show that there is a sharp contrast in the behavior of insiders from my earlier sample period (1986-1996) and the later “hot market” period (1997-2000). For the hot market period, there is a dramatic peak in the average number of shares sold by top insiders of acquiring firms in the month before the acquisition announcement date, followed by another sharp spike in sales when the deal approaches completion. These large increases in insider selling around the acquisition announcement are driven by firms whose insiders are “pure sellers.” This behavior is not observed for the earlier time period. For acquisitions occurring during the “hot market” period, acquirers whose insiders are “pure sellers” significantly underperform their control firms three years following the acquisitions, while acquirers whose insiders are “pure buyers” do not. Moreover, only “pure seller” acquirers experience deterioration in abnormal operating performance from the year before to three years after the acquisition, implying that these mergers are “bad mergers”. Overall, the evidence thatpure sellers are associated with worse long-term stock performance even after controlling for the “bad merger” effect indicates that overvaluation is an important motive for acquisitions. The evidence also suggests that the agency costs of overvalued equity described by Jensen (2005) could be an important explanation for wealth destroying deals in the late 1990s.
机译：本研究通过检查收购公告周围的收购公司的内部交易模式是否与长期的收购后业绩相关，测试了高估作为并购活动的解释，并提供了有关因高估而导致的收购后果的证据。我的发现表明，从我较早的样本时期（1986-1996年）到后来的“热市场”时期（1997-2000年），内部人的行为形成了鲜明的对比。在热市期间，收购公告的前一个月内，收购公司的高层内部人士出售的平均股票数量出现了惊人的峰值，而在交易接近完成时，销售又出现了急剧上升。收购公告前后内幕交易的大量增加是由内幕人士为“纯卖方”的公司推动的。在较早的时间段内未观察到此行为。对于在“热市场”时期发生的收购，内部人士为“纯卖方”的收购方在收购后三年内的表现明显逊于其控制公司，而内部人士为“纯买方”的收购方则没有。而且，只有“纯卖方”收购方从收购前一年到收购后三年的异常经营业绩恶化，这意味着这些合并是“不良合并”。总体而言，即使在控制了“不良合并”效应之后，纯卖方仍会与长期股票表现不佳相关联的证据表明，高估是收购的重要动机。证据还表明，詹森（2005）所描述的高估股权的代理成本可能是1990年代末破坏财富交易的重要解释。

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