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首页> 外文会议>Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08 >Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Phenomenon of National Student Loan Default
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Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Phenomenon of National Student Loan Default

机译：国家助学贷款违约现象的演化博弈分析

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摘要

-In order to reveal the national student loan game dynamic evolution path and discuss how to guard against national student loan risk, this paper adopts the dynamic evolution game replication method to analyze the choice behavior between the bank groups and the student groups. The result shows that the staple reason causing the failure of cooperation between the bank groups and student groups is that the reward and penalties of relevant law are inadequate to the loan students or the interest to the banks from the loan is less than their opportunity cost. Government should improve the risk compensation mechanism of the banks and increase the reward and penalties to the students, which will make a win-win situation between banks and students and solve the phenomenon of the national student loan default effectively.
机译：-为了揭示全国学生贷款博弈的动态演化路径，并探讨如何防范全国学生贷款风险，本文采用动态演化博弈的复制方法，对银行群体与学生群体之间的选择行为进行了分析。结果表明，造成银行集团与学生集团合作失败的最主要原因是贷款学生对相关法律的奖励和处罚不足，或者贷款给银行带来的利息低于其机会成本。政府应完善银行的风险补偿机制，加大对学生的奖惩力度，使银行与学生双赢，有效解决全国学生贷款违约现象。

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