【24h】

A Theoretical Study of Drug Safety Regulation

机译:药品安全法规的理论研究

获取原文

摘要

In order to ensure drug safety, the government has tried his best to strengthen regulation but it's not always effective. Whether inspections or penalties is more efficient to ensure the drug safety? With the theory of microeconomics, the author establishes regulation threat model to answer it. The author draws a conclusion that regulation threat can decrease violation of the regulations. The threat function of the frequency of penalty is more effectual than that of the amplitude of penalty. The total social utility can be increased more efficaciously by increasing the amplitude of penalty than the frequency of penalty. The amplitude and the frequency of penalty cannot be increased illimitably, and the total social utility is maximization when they are increased to and . The author puts forward a suggestion that we should formulate our regulation focus according to different regulation stages, we should focus on strengthening the frequency of penalty in the early stage, focus on strengthening the amplitude of penalty in the middle stage, focus on reformation in the late stage.
机译:为了确保药物安全,政府已尽力加强监管,但并不总是有效的。检查或处罚是否更有效地确保了药物安全?借助微观经济学理论,作者建立了规制威胁模型来对此进行回答。作者得出的结论是,法规威胁可以减少对法规的违反。惩罚频率的威胁功能比惩罚幅度的威胁功能更有效。通过增加刑罚的幅度而不是增加刑罚的频率,可以更有效地提高社会总实用性。惩罚的幅度和频率不能无限地增加,而当它们增加到和时,总的社会效用是最大的。作者提出了根据不同的监管阶段制定监管重点的建议,应着重于早期加大刑罚频率,着重于中期加大刑罚幅度,着重于监管改革。后期。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号