Controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and interests conflicts: Evidence from family firms in China

机译：控股股东，少数股东和利益冲突：来自中国家族企业的证据

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Nowadays the problem of controlling shareholders infringing minority shareholders' benefit has become the core to the company development. In order to prove the interest conflicts between the two and provide some helpful suggestions for minority shareholders protection, this paper has selected 82 listed family companies of China as the sample. And, by using the indirect method to establish a regression model and measuring the influence on enterprise value, which created by the separation of control and ownership of controlling shareholders, we try to proof if the infringement is existent. Then the result indicates that there is a negative correlation between the separation ratio of control and ownership and enterprise value. That is to say, when ownership goes smaller, the control goes bigger. Therefore, controlling shareholders' infringement motive will be more strong and minority will be infringed more easier. On the other hand, a certain extent of ownership concentration can reduce the agency costs between controlling shareholders and managers. However, a high ownership concentration will result in some agency problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.

机译：如今，控制股东侵害中小股东利益的问题已成为公司发展的核心。为了证明两者之间的利益冲突，为保护中小股东提供一些有益的建议，本文选取了82家中国上市家族企业作为样本。并且，通过使用间接方法建立回归模型并测量由控制权和控股股东的所有权分离而产生的对企业价值的影响，我们尝试证明侵权是否存在。结果表明，控制权与所有权分离率与企业价值之间存在负相关关系。也就是说，当所有权变小时，控制权变大。因此，控股股东的侵权动机会更强，少数股东的侵权会更容易。另一方面，一定程度的所有权集中可以减少控股股东和管理者之间的代理成本。但是，高度集中的所有权将导致控股股东与少数股东之间的一些代理问题。

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《2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government》|2011年|p.1-4|共4页
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Jiming Li; Kai Xu;
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中图分类数字通信网;
关键词
benefit infringement; company value; controlling shareholders; interest relationdhip; minority shareholders;

机译：利益侵权;公司价值;控股股东;利益关系;少数股东;

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机译：在意大利和其他地方的金字塔群体代表了所有权和控制权分离的模式。金字塔通常拥有大股东，以小股东的利益为代价提取控制权的私人利益。本文重点关注意大利案例，其中金字塔的数量在减少，但仍然在很大程度上分散。群体是一种壕沟形式，可能对企业的成长产生负面影响。它们的特点是利益冲突和自我交易做法，减少了外部融资机会。在本文中，讨论了意大利群体的法律规定，它具有积极的方面（第2497条，c.c。），但在自我交易实践方面存在一些弱点（第2391条和第2391条之二）。未来的改革应该考虑到欧洲层面的指导方针（例如，公司法专家和欧洲委员会的高级别小组），这些指导方针已被搁置在主要是欧洲政府的政治议程之外。此外，我们建议加强（不仅正式）向公司股东披露相关信息的过程，以便不拆除金字塔，而是使它们“更短”（在这种情况下），更透明并且相互竞争。

Controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and interests conflicts: Evidence from family firms in China

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