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首页> 外文会议>2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information >The excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders and corporation investment: Empirical evidence from Chinese capital market
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The excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders and corporation investment: Empirical evidence from Chinese capital market

机译：最终控股股东和公司投资的过度控制：来自中国资本市场的经验证据

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摘要

By taking the data on China's listed companies from 2002 to 2006, this paper investigate the effect of ultimate controlling shareholders on investment decision. The results show that, as for ultimate controlling shareholders of private firms, the higher the divergence between the cash-flow rights and the control rights is, the more serious is the underinvestment because of tunneling activities. The negative effects of agent problem on investment inefficiency are mainly in firms of the lower cash-flow rights. Furthermore, the results show that the high preference of cash holdings may be the mechanism resulting in underinvestment for ultimate controlling shareholders. However, all these conclusions may fail to explain some phenomena in the state-owned firms. This research gives a useful reference to understanding the disputation of privatization to improve efficiency from the view of investment. What is more, it also gives further complement to the theory of investment in developing countries.
机译：本文利用2002年至2006年中国上市公司的数据，研究了最终控股股东对投资决策的影响。结果表明，对于私有企业的最终控股股东而言，现金流权与控制权之间的差异越大，则由于隧道活动造成的投资不足越严重。代理人问题对投资效率低下的负面影响主要是现金流量权较低的公司。此外，结果表明，现金持有量的高度偏好可能是导致最终控股股东投资不足的机制。但是，所有这些结论可能无法解释国有企业中的某些现象。该研究为从投资的角度理解私有化的争议以提高效率提供了有益的参考。而且，它还进一步补充了对发展中国家的投资理论。

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