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Ultimate parent's board reform and controlling shareholder entrenchment: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

机译:最终的母公司董事会改革与控股股东的根深蒂固:来自中国的一项准自然实验的证据

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摘要

This paper examines whether the strengthening of board monitoring at the level of the ultimate parent company reduces their expropriation from the listed subsidiaries. Using a quasi-natural experiment in China, we find that a high presence of outside directors on the ultimate parent company significantly reduce the parent company's tunneling from listed subsidiaries. Furthermore, the ultimate parent's board monitoring in reducing the tunneling is more salient when the ultimate parent company has strong management control in listed subsidiaries and complicated pyramid ownership structure in the listed subsidiaries.
机译:本文研究了在最终母公司层面加强董事会监督是否会减少其从上市子公司中被没收的现象。通过在中国进行的准自然实验,我们发现在最终母公司中大量外部董事的出现大大减少了母公司与上市子公司之间的联系。此外,如果最终母公司在上市子公司中拥有强大的管理控制权,并且在上市子公司中具有复杂的金字塔所有权结构,则最终母公司董事会在减少隧道业务方面的监控就更加重要。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Emerging markets review》 |2019年第3期|389-403|共15页
  • 作者单位

    Sun Yat Sen Univ, Business Sch, Ctr Accounting Finance & Inst, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China;

    Sun Yat Sen Univ, Business Sch, Ctr Accounting Finance & Inst, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China;

    Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Univ Coll, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China;

    Jinan Univ, Management Sch, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China;

    Sun Yat Sen Univ, Business Sch, Ctr Accounting Finance & Inst, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Board reform; Outside director; Ultimate parent; Tunneling; Emerging market;

    机译:董事会改革;外部董事;最终母公司;隧道;新兴市场;

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