Investors can sell short on designated stocks in China's stock market since March 2010 when the CSRC relieved the short sale constraint.The paper provides a quasi-natural experiment to examine whether short selling pressure can discipline the controlling shareholder's exploitation.Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2007-2014,the results show that short selling pressures from the removal of the short sale constraints have a governance effect on the pursuit of private benefit of controlling shareholders.Downside risk is the economic mechanism through which short-selling threat disciplines the controlling shareholders.The governance effect from short sale is much stronger when other corporate governance mechanisms are weak.The cross-sectional tests suggest that the higher the proportion of shares the controller holds or the higher bankruptcy risk of the firm faces,the more reduction in the exploitation of controllers in pilot firms after the removal of short sale constraint.This paper provides further insight into the discipline effect of short selling on controlling shareholders in pursuing private benefits,and contributes to the literature on the effects of the removal of the short selling constraints on the real economy.%使用中国金融市场卖空管制放松政策作为准自然实验,本文考察由此产生的卖空压力对公司控股股东私利侵占的因果效应.使用双重差分方法的研究结果表明在卖空管制放松之后,控股股东的私利侵占行为减少了27％.卖空管制放松引发的股价下跌风险是卖空压力约束控股股东私利侵占行为的重要渠道.进一步研究表明这种影响还依赖于其他治理机制,当公司其他大股东股权制衡较弱、产品市场竞争程度较低以及公司所处地区外部法律环境较差时,卖空压力产生的治理效应更强.横截面差异检验结果表明公司控股股东持股比例越高或者公司破产清算风险越高,卖空管制放松的治理效应越强.最后,研究结果表明这种治理效应能够提升公司经营业绩与市场价值.本文有助于理解卖空压力对公司控股股东私利侵占行为的影响,丰富和补充了卖空管制放松对实体经济真实影响的文献.
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