• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>ATRS world conference >Modeling airline competition in an airfare regulated domestic market
【24h】

Modeling airline competition in an airfare regulated domestic market

机译：在受机票管理的国内市场中模拟航空公司竞争

获取原文
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Domestic air transport market is extremely competitive because of high investment inaircraft fleet and high fare comparing to surface transportation systems. Since most ofairlines operate more than one domestic air routes, airlines operating greater number ofroutes may have a better chance to fully utilize their aircraft fleets and adopt differentcompetition strategies than those having fewer routes. To avoid such unfair competitions,ceiling and floor prices regulated by the government can properly control the pricingflexibility and market power of the dominated airlines. Based on this, this paper proposesa bi-level game-theoretic airfare control and airline competition model, where the upperlevel aims to determine the optimal ceiling and floor price toward the social welfaremaximization, while the lower level attempts to model airline competition behaviors inthe market. A case study on two airlines operating a total of 21 routes in Taiwan domesticair market is conducted to investigate the applicability of the proposed model. Resultsconsistently show that the through optimal settings of ceiling and floor prices caneffectively reduce airline unfair competition and increase social welfare.
机译：国内航空运输市场竞争激烈，原因是在 与地面运输系统相比，飞机机队和高票价。由于大多数 航空公司经营多于一条国内航线，航空公司经营更多 航线可能有更好的机会充分利用其飞机机队并采用不同的 竞争策略要比路线少的竞争策略好。为了避免这种不公平的竞争， 政府规定的最高和最低价格可以适当控制价格 主导航空公司的灵活性和市场力量。基于此，本文提出 双层博弈论的飞机票价控制和航空公司竞争模型，其中上层 该级别旨在确定针对社会福利的最佳最高限价和最低限价 最大化，而下层试图模拟航空公司的竞争行为 市场。国内两家运营21条航线的航空公司的案例研究 航空市场进行了调查，以研究该模型的适用性。结果 始终表明，通过对最高和最低价格进行最佳设置，可以 有效减少航空公司的不正当竞争，增加社会福利。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号