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首页> 外文会议>IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security >Rolling preambles: Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems
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Rolling preambles: Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems

机译：前言：缓解基于OFDM的802.11系统中的隐匿FO估计攻击

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Modern wireless systems and standards increasingly rely on OFDM for high-throughput communications. However, these systems are often highly vulnerable to selective jamming attacks, particularly when a jammer targets (part of) the known frame preamble. In this paper, we consider one of the most disruptive jamming attacks against the preamble-based frequency offset (FO) estimation in IEEE 802.11a/ac/ax systems and develop four techniques to mitigate this attack. Two of these techniques are based on randomly changing the first half of the standard frame preamble at the transmitter while maintaining its backward compatibility with legacy receivers. Specifically, we design a set of new preamble waveforms that satisfy the expected characteristics of a preamble in 802.11 systems. The other two techniques take a receiver-based approach and exploit the parts of the preamble that are not under attack to estimate the FO. We conduct extensive simulations and illustrative USRP experiments to study the effectiveness of these countermeasures.
机译：现代无线系统和标准越来越依赖于OFDM进行高吞吐量通信。但是，这些系统通常极易受到选择性干扰的攻击，特别是当干扰器瞄准已知帧前导码（的一部分）时。在本文中，我们考虑了针对IEEE 802.11a / n / ac / ax系统中基于前导的频偏（FO）估计的最具破坏性的干扰攻击之一，并开发了四种缓解这种攻击的技术。这些技术中的两种是基于在发射机处随机更改标准帧前同步码的前半部分，同时保持其与传统接收机的向后兼容性。具体来说，我们设计了一组新的前同步码波形，这些波形可满足802.11系统中前同步码的预期特性。其他两种技术采用基于接收器的方法，并利用未受到攻击的前同步码部分来估计FO。我们进行了广泛的模拟和USRP说明性实验，以研究这些对策的有效性。

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