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首页> 外文会议>IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security >Rolling preambles: Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems
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Rolling preambles: Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems

机译：滚动前导码：在基于OFDM的802.11系统中缓解隐身FO估计攻击

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摘要

Modern wireless systems and standards increasingly rely on OFDM for high-throughput communications. However, these systems are often highly vulnerable to selective jamming attacks, particularly when a jammer targets (part of) the known frame preamble. In this paper, we consider one of the most disruptive jamming attacks against the preamble-based frequency offset (FO) estimation in IEEE 802.11a/n/ac/ax systems and develop four techniques to mitigate this attack. Two of these techniques are based on randomly changing the first half of the standard frame preamble at the transmitter while maintaining its backward compatibility with legacy receivers. Specifically, we design a set of new preamble waveforms that satisfy the expected characteristics of a preamble in 802.11 systems. The other two techniques take a receiver-based approach and exploit the parts of the preamble that are not under attack to estimate the FO. We conduct extensive simulations and illustrative USRP experiments to study the effectiveness of these countermeasures.
机译：现代无线系统和标准越来越依赖OFDM进行高吞吐量通信。然而，这些系统通常很容易受到选择性干扰攻击的影响，特别是当已知帧序列的干扰靶（部分）时。在本文中，我们考虑对IEEE 802.11A / N / AC / AX系统中的前导码频率偏移（FO）估计的最具破坏性的干扰攻击之一，并开发四种技术来缓解该攻击。这些技术中的两种基于随机改变发射器处的标准帧前导码的前半部分，同时保持其向后兼容与传统接收器的兼容性。具体而言，我们设计一组新的前导波形，其满足802.11系统中序言的预期特性。另外两种技术采用基于接收器的方法，并利用不受攻击的前导码的部分来估计FO。我们进行广泛的模拟和说明性USRP实验，以研究这些对策的有效性。

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