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首页> 外文会议>IAEE International Conference;International Association for Energy Economics >When is Energy Storage Valuable? The Impact of Carbon Policy, Resource Availability, and Technology Efficiency on a Renewable-Thermal Power System
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When is Energy Storage Valuable? The Impact of Carbon Policy, Resource Availability, and Technology Efficiency on a Renewable-Thermal Power System

机译：储能何时有价值？碳政策，资源可用性和技术效率对可再生热电系统的影响

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OverviewConcerns about climate change have spurred governments to reduce carbon emissions by supporting adoption ofrenewable energy (RE) technologies. For example, in Germany, the share of RE in the power sector increased to30% in 2014 as compared to less than 5% in 1990 due to policy measures such as feed-in tariffs (von Hirschhausen,2014). Due to the intermittent and location-specific nature of RE technologies, energy storage has become importantbecause it could be used to smooth out temporal disparities in residual demand. Using stylised equilibrium models,Sioshansi (2010, 2014) investigates the welfare implications of storage ownership, market power, and deviceefficiency. Focusing on a numerical study of the California power sector, Bushnell (2003) also uses an equilibriumapproach to illustrate how producers with market power have the incentive to withhold hydropower generationduring peak hours and to move it to off-peak hours instead. Thus, the marginal value of water is lower in an industrywith market power and may even be negative as posited by Crampes and Moreaux (2001). Indeed, restructuring ofthe electricity industry has provoked interest in how hydropower producers’ incentives to shift generation betweenpeak and off-peak periods are affected (Mathiesen et al., 2013), but a comprehensive analysis of carbon policy, REresource availability, and storage efficiency on producers’ incentives and the value of storage has been lacking. Inthis paper, we address these aspects in order to specify the conditions under which RE producers with storage areinclined to shift deployment of the resource and its implications for the marginal value of RE storage.MethodsWe develop an equilibrium model with an RE and a thermal producer. Although the marginal cost of RE generationis zero, there is a finite amount of the RE resource, D, that must be fully used by the RE producer across periods 1(off-peak) and 2 (peak). Furthermore, there is an inefficiency, F, associated with the RE storage device. By contrast,the thermal producer has a linear marginal cost of generation and may be subject to a carbon tax, T, but has nocapacity constraint. Given linear inverse demand functions for each time period, we find the Nash-Cournotequilibrium between these profit-maximising producers (Crampes and Moreaux, 2001).ResultsFocusing on interior solutions under both perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly, we first prove analytically thatthe main result of Bushnell (2003), i.e., more off-peak RE production under Cournot oligopoly as compared toperfect competition, holds without a carbon tax. However, for a certain threshold of the carbon tax, the incentive ofthe RE producer to generate more in the off-peak period under Cournot oligopoly is mitigated by the fact that themarginal value of RE storage, μ, increases with the carbon tax (Figure 1). This unambiguously decreases thermalgeneration in both periods under Cournot oligopoly but makes it possible for peak thermal generation to increaseunder perfect competition. Thus, the carbon tax depresses peak RE production less under Cournot oligopoly thanunder perfect competition, which means that the main finding of Bushnell (2003) may not hold with a carbon tax.Intuitively, under perfect competition, the imposition of a carbon tax has the direct effect of increasing the marginalcost of thermal generation, which reduces thermal output (and increases RE output) in both periods. At the sametime, there is an indirect effect that increases the marginal value of RE storage, μ, as the RE resource becomesrelatively scarce with a carbon tax. This intertemporal effect reduces RE generation in both periods but more so inthe peak period due to the inefficiency of storage. Consequently, this countervailing indirect effect may actuallyincrease peak-period thermal generation as RE output shifts from the peak to the off-peak period (Figure 2).Investigating RE resource availability, we find that it unambiguously decreases the marginal value of RE storage(Figure 3), which leads to more (less) RE (thermal) output with a greater impact in the peak period under bothperfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. Finally, more inefficient RE storage, i.e., higher F, has contrastingeffects on the marginal value of RE storage under perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly (Figure 4). A ceterisparibus degradation in efficiency monotonically increases the marginal value of RE storage under Cournot oligopolyas there is less (more) period-1 RE (thermal) production and a higher RE storage value in order to preserve the RE resource for period 2. Under perfect competition, this result holds only if RE storage is relatively efficient, i.e., if REstorage is relatively inefficient, then a ceteris paribus degradation in its efficiency actually increases (decreases)period-1 RE (thermal) production and lowers RE storage value as it is not worthwhile to preserve the RE resource.ConclusionsWe examine the implications of policy interventions and technological change on the marginal value of RE storage.Via a stylised equilibrium model, we specify why findings from the storage literature may not hold and howincentives for storage investment may be affected. Hence, these results may inform the regulatory process governingmarket design of a power sector with increasing capacities of RE generation and storage.
机译：概述 对气候变化的担忧促使各国政府通过支持采用二氧化碳来减少碳排放。 可再生能源（RE）技术。例如，在德国，可再生能源在电力部门的份额增加到 由于采取上网电价等政策措施，2014年为30％，而1990年则不到5％（冯·赫希豪森（von Hirschhausen， 2014）。由于可再生能源技术的间歇性和针对特定地点的特性，储能变得非常重要 因为它可以用来消除剩余需求中的时间差异。使用程式化的均衡模型 Sioshansi（2010，2014）研究了存储所有权，市场支配力和设备对福利的影响 效率。 Bushnell（2003）着重于对加州电力部门的数值研究，也使用了均衡 说明拥有市场支配力的生产者如何有动力拒绝水力发电的方法 在高峰时段将其移至非高峰时段。因此，水的边际价值在一个行业中较低 具有市场支配力，甚至可能是负的，如Crampes和Moreaux（2001）所假定的那样。的确， 电力行业引起了人们对水电生产商如何在两地之间转换发电量的动机产生兴趣 高峰期和非高峰期都受到影响（Mathiesen等人，2013），但是对碳政策的综合分析，可再生能源 缺乏资源，存储效率以及生产者的激励机制以及存储的价值。在 在本文中，我们着眼于这些方面，以指定具有存储条件的可再生能源生产商所处的条件 倾向于转移资源的部署及其对可再生能源存储边际价值的影响。 方法 我们开发了一个具有可再生能源和热量产生者的平衡模型。虽然可再生能源的边际成本 为零，则有限数量的RE资源D必须由RE生产者在期间1内完全使用 （非高峰）和2（高峰）。此外，与RE存储设备相关联的效率低F。相比之下， 热力生产者的边际发电成本是线性的，可能要缴纳碳税T，但没有 容量限制。给定每个时间段的线性逆需求函数，我们找到Nash-Cournot 这些利润最大化的生产者之间的均衡（Crampes和Moreaux，2001）。 结果 我们着眼于完美竞争和古诺寡头垄断下的室内解决方案，首先通过分析证明 Bushnell（2003）的主要结果，即与 完美的竞争，无需缴纳碳税。但是，对于一定的碳税起征点， 可再生能源生产者在古诺寡头垄断的非高峰时期产生更多的产量，这是由于以下事实而减轻的： 可再生能源的边际价值μ随着碳税的增加而增加（图1）。这无疑降低了热量 古诺寡头垄断下两个时期的热发电量，但峰值热发电量有可能增加 在完美竞争中。因此，在古诺寡头垄断下，碳税对峰值可再生能源的抑制作用要小于 在完全竞争下，这意味着布什内尔（2003）的主要发现可能不适用碳税。 凭直觉，在完全竞争下，征收碳税具有增加边际收益的直接作用。 产生热能的成本，这会降低两个时期的热输出（并增加可再生能源的输出）。在同一时间 时间，存在一个间接影响，即随着RE资源变为 碳税相对稀缺。这种跨期效应减少了两个时期的可再生能源发电量，但在 由于存储效率低下导致的高峰期。因此，这种抵消性间接影响实际上可能 随着RE输出从峰值到非峰值时段的变化，峰值峰值热量的产生会增加（图2）。 通过调查可再生能源的资源可用性，我们发现它无疑降低了可再生能源存储的边际价值 （图3），这会导致更多（更少）的RE（热）输出，并在两种情况下的峰值时段产生更大的影响 完美的竞争和古诺寡头垄断。最后，效率较低的可再生能源存储（即更高的F）具有鲜明的对比 完全竞争和古诺寡头垄断下对可再生能源储备边际价值的影响（图4）。塞提克斯 在古诺寡头垄断下，效率的边际退化单调增加了可再生能源存储的边际价值 因为第1阶段的RE（热）生产较少（更多），并且为了保留第2阶段的RE资源，RE的存储价值更高。在完全竞争的情况下，只有在RE存储相对高效的情况下，该结果才成立。回覆 存储效率相对较低，那么，塞特里斯的稀疏效率实际上会提高（降低） 第1阶段的RE（热）生产，并降低了RE的存储价值，因为这不值得保留RE资源。 结论 我们研究了政策干预和技术变革对可再生能源存储边际价值的影响。 通过程式化的均衡模型，我们指定了为什么存储文献中的结果可能不成立以及如何 仓储投资的激励措施可能会受到影响。因此，这些结果可能会为监管过程提供指导。 具有不断增加的可再生能源发电和存储能力的电力行业的市场设计。

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