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A Bayesian game analysis of cooperative MAC with incentive for wireless networks

机译：具有无线网络激励的协同MAC的贝叶斯博弈分析

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In this paper, we analyze a cooperative medium access scheme in a wireless relaying network using Bayesian games, where the participating nodes are peers subject to the half-duplex constraint and they choose to cooperate or not cooperate based on its expected utility. We first set up a one-stage game and derive the ex-post utility. A two-stage game with incomplete information is further formulated to incorporate an incentive mechanism, which charges the cooperation requester and rewards the helper via adapting their channel access probabilities. We prove that the not-cooperating strategy can always achieve a Nash equilibrium (NE) in one-stage and two-stage games as long as the access cost is constrained. More importantly, we derive the sufficient conditions so that cooperating is an NE strategy and supports higher utility than the not-cooperating strategy. Numerical results are presented to validate our analysis and demonstrate that optimal tuning factors can be determined to ensure NE and maximize system utility.
机译：在本文中，我们使用贝叶斯游戏分析了在无线中继网络中的协作媒体访问方案，其中参与节点是对同学进行半双工约束的对等体，并且他们选择基于其预期的实用程序进行协作或不协作。我们首先建立一个单级游戏并得出前柱的实用程序。进一步制定了一个具有不完整信息的两级游戏，以包含一个激励机制，该机制将通过调整其渠道访问概率来指控合作请求者并奖励帮助者。只要访问成本受到约束，我们证明了非合作策略总是可以在一级和两级游戏中实现纳什均衡（NE）。更重要的是，我们派生了足够的条件，以便协作是网元策略，并支持比非合作策略更高的效用。提出了数值结果以验证我们的分析，并证明可以确定最佳调谐因子以确保NE和最大化系统实用程序。

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