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Restriction mechanism and perquisites consumption of executives based on Chinese state-owned enterprises

机译:基于中国国有企业的高管的限制机制与毋庸置疑

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This paper tests the relationship between restriction mechanism and executives' perquisites consumption at the expense of the shareholders based on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Regression results for a sample of SOEs in China support the hypotheses that internal governance factors, such as debt, managerial stock ownership and the independent director system can effectively restrict executives' perquisites consumption, but managers' scale not.
机译:本文测试了基于国有企业(国有企业)的股东的限制机制与高管毫无疑问的关系。 中国国有企业样本的回归结果支持内部治理因素的假设,如债务,管理股票所有权和独立董事系统可以有效地限制高管的禁止消费,而是管理人员的规模。

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