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Evolutionary Game on the Utility Decision of the Duopoly Retailers' Marketing Objectives

机译：Duoly零售商营销目标的实用决策进化游戏

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摘要

Firstly, model the evolutionary game dynamical system on the utility decision of the retailers' marketing objectives in the duopoly situation, individuals in the same retailer group procure goods from the same supplier, and each individuals could select profit strategy or revenue strategy. Secondly, based on standard and spiteful replicator dynamic equation, use new replicator dynamical equation to study whether the equilibrium points are evolutionary stable strategies. Finally, simulate how the proportion of choosing profit strategy changes as time goes. The study shows that if the market scale meets certain constraints and the weight value of decision preference on the profit maximization marketing objective is more than 1/3, the retailer will choose profit as the marketing objective, and vice versa. The probability of the individuals competing with each other within the same group and the demand elastic coefficient don't influence the result of the evolutionary stable strategies, but influence the evolutionary process of replicator dynamical systems.
机译：首先，模型对零售商营销目标的实用决定的进化游戏动力学系统在双层局势中，同一零售商集团的个人从同一供应商采购商品，每个人都可以选择利润战略或收入策略。其次，基于标准和恶意的复制器动态方程，使用新的复制器动态方程来研究均衡点是否是进化稳定的策略。最后，模拟随着时间的推移，选择利润策略的比例如何变化。该研究表明，如果市场规模符合某些限制和决策偏好的重量价值超过1/3，则零售商将选择利润作为营销目标，反之亦然。在同一组中互相竞争的个人竞争的概率和需求弹性系数不会影响进化稳定策略的结果，而是影响复制器动态系统的进化过程。

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