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A Study of the Owner's Commission Model and Incentive Contract Based on Principal-Agent Relationship

机译：基于委托 - 代理关系的业主委员会模型及激励合同研究

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摘要

In the engineering, the formation of a typical principal-agent relationship is formed between the owner and the engineering-construction supervisor. The owner entrusts the supervisor with the construction management and monitors his work. The owner's question is how to choose the right commission model on the basis of his monitoring capacity and design an optimal contract to encourage the supervisor to choose action which meets the owner's maximal interest. By comparing the supervisor' s optimal behavior choices under the incentive contract which only contains sharing the result and under the incentive-monitoring contract which contains sharing the result and monitoring the process, this article proves that when the level of the owner's monitoring capacity is higher than a critical value, the owner should choose partial commission model and design the incentive-monitoring contract ,and keep improving his level of monitoring capacity in order to pursue the higher level of the supervisor's effort. When the level of the owner's monitoring capacity is lower than the critical value, the owner should choose complete commission model and design the incentive contract which only contains sharing the result. In view of the engineering practice, we point out that the competence of the owner's representative will impact the owner's optimal choice.
机译：在工程中，在所有者和工程建设主管之间形成典型的委托代理关系的形成。主人用施工管理委托主管并监控他的工作。业主的问题是如何根据他的监测能力选择正确的佣金模型，并设计最佳合同，以鼓励主管选择符合所有者最大利益的行动。通过下只包含共享的结果，并在其中包含共享的结果和监视过程的激励，监督合同，这篇文章证明，当主人的监测能力水平较高的激励合同主管的最优行为选择比较与临界价值经，业主应选择部分委员会模型并设计激励监测合同，并继续提高他的监测能力水平，以便追求监督员努力的更高水平。当所有者监控容量的水平低于临界值时，所有者应选择完整的佣金模型并设计仅包含共享结果的激励合同。鉴于工程实践，我们指出所有者代表的能力会影响所有者的最佳选择。

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