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Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer risk-aversion

机译：制造商风险厌恶下绿色供应链收入合同

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摘要

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established. Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price, and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain. The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price, and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.
机译：背景技术在两个阶段绿色供应链由制造商和零售商组成，考虑到风险厌恶和产品绿色，消费者偏好等因素，建立了集中决策游戏模型和制造商领先的Stackelberg游戏模型。然后比较两个游戏模型。制造商和零售商的产品绿色，批发价格，产品价格和风险厌恶公用事业的互动也得到解散。最后，采取收入共享合同来协调绿色供应链。结果表明：（1）在集中决策模型中，产品绿色度存在临界值; （2）在制造商领先的Stackelberg游戏模型中，产品的绿色程度越高，制造商的批发价格越高，批发价格随着风险厌购机构的提高而增加;（3）收入分享合同可以协调这一目标制造商风险厌恶下的绿色供应链类型。

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