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Questioning Public Policy's 'Maintained Assumption': The Case of Governance Rules Impacting Regulatory Sanctions among Capital Market Players in Malaysia

机译:质疑公共政策的“维持假设”:治理规则影响马来西亚资本市场参与者的监管制裁

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摘要

Legal obligations are primarily introduced and enforced on capital market players with the aim of ensuring orderly capital market activities which should (rightfully) lead to capital market stability and hence unhindered economic growth. In the Malaysian context, listed firms being part of the Country's capital market players are mandated to observe and comply with extensive capital market rules introduced and enforced by the Country's capital market regulatory bodies. It includes the need for listed firms to practice sound governance and transparent reporting of financial information. These market disciplining apparatus are essentially economic centric public policies, developed and subsequently imposed on public listed firms premising on the maintained assumption that strong and sound governance structures would result in enhanced market discipline. This research paper reports empirical findings which form part of a larger research project on regulatory sanctions in Malaysia. Examining specific and conventional governance, ownership and firm specific elements comparatively between sanctioned and matched non-sanctioned firms between 2001 and 2008, we document prelude evidence questioning the validity of governance rules' maintained assumptions that strong and sound governance structures would at least, insulate firms from being sanctioned. The results further signify the entrenched culture of box-ticking among listed firms in Malaysia, whereby the problem practically forms large improvement void which are potentially detrimental to the Country's capital market stability if left unattended.
机译:法律义务主要介绍并强制执行资本市场参与者,其目的是确保(重新)的有序资本市场活动,这些活动应导致资本市场稳定,因此不受阻碍的经济增长。在马来西亚的背景下,列出的公司成为该国的资本市场参与者的一部分,被要求观察和遵守该国的资本市场监管机构的广泛资本市场规则。它包括所列公司的需要,以练习健全的治理和透明报告财务信息。这些市场纪律装置基本上是经济为中心的公共政策,开发和随后强加于在维持的假设上的公共上市公司,即强大和健全的治理结构将导致增加市场纪律。本研究论文报告了对马来西亚的监管制裁的一部分进行了实证调查。在2001年至2008年期间,审查了具体和常规治理,所有权和特定的特定因素,我们在2001年至2008年间非批准公司之间的特定因素,提出了质疑治理规则的有效性的证据证明了,即强大和声音治理结构至少,绝缘公司的保留性规则的保证从被批准。结果进一步涉及马来西亚上市公司之间的箱体卷积文化的根深蒂固的文化,其中问题实际上形成了大量的改善空白,这可能会对该国的资本市场稳定,如果无人看管。

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