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Power Allocation of Jamming Attackers against PEV Charging Stations: A Game Theoretical Approach

机译:对PEV充电站的干扰攻击者的电力分配:一种游戏理论方法

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This paper considers a system consisting of multiple attackers, lots of charging stations and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). The attackers conduct channel jamming attacks and benefit from snatching customers (i.e., PEVs) from the victim charging stations. Suppose that the attackers are selfish and they attempt to maximize their own average net revenue per unit time. We aim to investigate the problem of how to appropriately choose its transmit power to conduct the jamming attack for every attacker. We formulate this problem as a noncooperative game, and show the existence of its solution, i.e., a Nash equilibrium (NE). Due to the existence of some coupling constraints, the game is a Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), which is usually hard to solve. To overcome this challenge, here we introduce a variation inequality (VI) approach. More specifically, we treat the game as a VI problem, and prove the existence of its solution. We develop an iterative algorithm to compute the solution to the VI problem, which corresponds to an NE of our game. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness and the efficiency of our proposed algorithm.
机译:本文考虑了由多个攻击者,许多充电站和插入电动车(PEV)组成的系统。攻击者对受害者充电站的抢夺客户(即PEV)进行渠道干扰攻击并受益。假设攻击者是自私的,他们试图每单位时间最大限度地提高自己的平均净收入。 We aim to investigate the problem of how to appropriately choose its transmit power to conduct the jamming attack for every attacker.我们将此问题作为非支持性游戏,并显示其解决方案,即纳什均衡(NE)。由于存在一些耦合约束,游戏是广义纳什均衡问题(GNEP),通常很难解决。为了克服这一挑战,我们在这里介绍了一种变异不等式(VI)方法。更具体地,我们将游戏视为VI问题,并证明其解决方案的存在。我们开发了一种迭代算法来计算对VI问题的解决方案,这对应于我们游戏的NE。数值结果证明了我们所提出的算法的有效性和效率。

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