• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>Nuclear Weapons and Related Security Issues Conference >Unmaking the Bomb: Verifying Limits on the Stockpiles of Nuclear Weapons
【24h】

Unmaking the Bomb: Verifying Limits on the Stockpiles of Nuclear Weapons

机译：脱炸弹：验证核武器库存的限制

获取原文
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Verifying limits on the stockpiles of nuclear weapons may require the ability for international inspectors to account for individual warheads, even when non-deployed, and to confirm the authenticity of nuclear warheads prior to dismantlement. These are fundamentally new challenges for nuclear verification, and they have been known for some time; unfortunately, due to a lack of sense of urgency, research in this area has not made substantial progress over the past 20 years. This chapter explores the central outstanding issues and offers a number of possible paths forward. In the case of confirming numerical limits, these include innovative tagging techniques and approaches solely based on declarations using modern cryptographic escrow schemes; with regard to warhead confirmation, there has recently been increasing interest in developing fundamentally new measurement approaches where, in one form or another, sensitive information is not acquired in the first place. Overall, new international R&D efforts could more usefully focus on non-intrusive technologies and approaches, which may show more promise for early demonstration and adoption. In the meantime, while warhead dismantlements remain unverified, nuclear weapon states ought to begin to document warhead assembly, refurbishment, and dismantlement activities and movements of warheads and warhead components through the weapons complex in ways that international inspectors will find credible at a later time. Again, such a process could be enabled by modern cryptographic techniques such as blockchaining. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is important to recognize that the main reason for the complexity of technologies and approaches needed for nuclear disarmament verification is the requirement to protect information that nuclear weapon states consider sensitive. Ultimately, if information security concerns cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders, an alternative would be to "reveal the secre
机译：核查核武器库存的限制可能需要国际检查员能够考虑个体弹头，即使在拆除之前确认核弹头的真实性。这些都是对核验证的基本新的挑战，并且已知一段时间;不幸的是，由于缺乏紧迫感，在过去的20年里，这一领域的研究并未取得实质性进展。本章探讨中央未突出的问题，并提供了许多可能的路径。在确认数值限制的情况下，这些包括创新标记技术，仅基于使用现代加密托管计划的声明;关于弹头确认，最近越来越越来越兴趣开发从一个形式或另一种形式的敏感信息的基本新的测量方法的利益。总体而言，新的国际研发努力可以更有用的是，更专注于非侵入式技术和方法，这可能会对早期示范和采用提供更多的承诺。与此同时，虽然弹头拆除仍然是未经证实的，但核武器国家应该通过武器复杂的方式开始记录弹头组装，翻新和拆除弹头和弹头组件的动作和动弹组件的动作，以便在稍后时间找到可信的可信度。同样，这种过程可以通过现代加密技术（例如块）划分。最后，也许最重要的是，重要的是要认识到，核裁军核查所需的技术和方法的复杂性的主要原因是保护核武器国家考虑敏感的信息。最终，如果信息安全问题无法解决所有利益攸关方的满意，则另一种选择将是“揭示SECRE

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号