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Marketing Intensity and Firm Performance: The Mediating Role of Information Risk

机译:营销强度和公司绩效:信息风险的调解作用

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Firms communicate with investors by making company information available to the public.However,certain private information resides within firms and some are not equally disseminated across different market participants.The discrepancies of information held by firms and different groups of investors create information asymmetry,which in turn spurs information risk.Extant literature identifies information imprecision and dispersion as the two focal aspects of information risk(Bhattacharya et al.2012).According to this view,investors'valuation inaccuracy denotes imprecision whereas their disagreement pertinent to firm values signifies information dispersion.The effects of information risk on firm value and financial cost are critical.Previous studies suggest that asset prices fall significantly when information risk increases(e.g.,Easley et al.2002;Kelly and Ljungqvist 2012).Most notably,investors in firms with high information risk cannot adjust their investment to incorporate new information(i.e.,firms retain greater private information)and hence,demand higher returns to compensate for higher risk(Easley and O'hara 2004).Such firms will have higher cost of capital(Bhattacharya et al.2012;Easley and O'hara 2004;Levi and Zhang 2015).As cost of capital is an essential benchmark used internally by companies(as an internal rate of return aiding investment decisions)and externally by investors(as an average required rate of return expected from investment in firms'debts and equity)(e.g.,Brealey et al.2020),reducing information risk is mere compulsory.
机译:公司通过将公司信息提供给公众的公司信息。然而,某些私人信息驻地在公司内,有些私人信息在不同的市场参与者之间并没有同样传播。公司持有的信息和不同投资者群体的差异创造信息不对称转动马刺信息风险。扩调文献将信息不精确和色散识别为信息风险的两个局部方面(Bhattacharya等人)。根据这一观点,投资者的Valuation incurcuracy表示不精确,而他们与公司价值观相关的分歧意味着信息分散。信息风险对公司价值和财务成本的影响是至关重要的。另一种研究表明,当信息风险增加时(例如,Easley等,2012年),资产价格会显着下降风险无法调整其投资,以合并新通知ation(即,公司保留更大的私人信息),因此,要求更高的回报以补偿更高的风险(Easley和O'Hara 2004).such公司将具有更高的资本成本(Bhattacharya等,2012; Easley和O'hara 2004年; Levi和Zhang 2015)。资本成本是公司内部使用的基准(作为返回答复投资决策的内部率)和投资者外部(作为预期的平均所需的返回率,从事公司的投资。和股权)(例如,Breyley等,20120年),减少信息风险仅仅是强制性的。

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