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首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Traffic Engineering and Transportation System >The Impact of Auditor Switch on Private Sector's Financial Constraints during the Implementation of the PPP Contract: Empirical Analysis Based on PSM-DID Model
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The Impact of Auditor Switch on Private Sector's Financial Constraints during the Implementation of the PPP Contract: Empirical Analysis Based on PSM-DID Model

机译：审计师开关在实施PPP合约期间私营部门的财务限制的影响：基于PSM模型的实证分析

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Government intervention is the primary reason for the failure of PPP projects in China.Therefore,project implementing agencies should"loosen the shackle"of social capital or project companies(private sector),so as to give full play to their subjective initiative and innovative spirit.Practically,however,the winning of the social capital or the project company in the implementation of the PPP will tend to take opportunism behaviour in order to increase their income,resulting in the phenomenon of"the winner's curse",so the project implementing agencies still need through inspection,testing,auditing,and other ways to supervise and control the social capital or the project company.Based on the above research background,It will be of great significance to explore the impact of auditor changes on the subsequent financing constraints of the private sector during the implementation of PPP contracts.Using data from listed companies participating in PPP project construction from 2000 to 2017,through the PSM-DID model,we find that: After eliminating the selectivity bias,auditor changes result in additional costs of debt;Audit opinion shopping,accompanied by auditor changes,makes listed companies face greater debt financing constraints during the implementation of the PPP contract.The results of this study enrich the research on the influence factors of corporate financial constraints and the corporate governance mechanisms of audit market,and reveal the effectiveness of audit supervision in PPP mode to improve project management efficiency and project operation.
机译：政府干预是中国PPP项目失败的主要原因。因此，项目执行机构应该“松开社会资本或项目公司（私营部门）的”卸扣“，以便充分发挥其主观主动和创新精神然而，正如“社会资本或项目公司在实施PPP的情况下，倾向于采取机会主义行为，以增加其收入，从而导致”胜利诅咒“的现象，因此实施机构的项目仍然需要通过检查，检测，审计和其他方式监督和控制社会资本或项目公司。基于上述研究背景​​，探索审计师对随后的融资限制的影响是重要的私营部门在实施PPP合同期间。从上市公司的数据从2000年到2017年参加PPP项目建设，Thr抛出PSM-DID模型，我们发现：在消除选择性偏见后，审计师变化导致额外的债务成本;审计意见购物伴随着审计员的变化，使得在执行PPP合同期间使上市公司面临更大的债务融资限制。本研究结果丰富了对企业财政限制的影响因素和审计市场的公司治理机制，并揭示了PPP模式审计监督的有效性，提高了项目管理效率和项目运作。

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