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首页> 外文会议>IAF Space Systems Symposium;International Astronautical Congress >Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering
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Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

机译：空间计划宣传可以扭曲项目管理和损坏系统工程

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Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and sche
机译：过度乐观的项目宣传往往会导致夸大的业绩索赔和低估成本和时间表。这可以扭曲项目管理和损坏系统工程。美国宇航局项目，如航天飞机和哈勃是极端的例子。美国航空航天局在阿波罗月亮登陆的壮观成功似乎产生了过度自信和粗心，而且在被证明是错误的情况下，在不切实际的声明和宽恕方面也得到了宽容。阿波罗风险分析预测了许多宇航员的死亡。这被认为是对阿波罗计划可能会造成损害，因此停止风险分析。月亮着陆击败了糟糕的赔率，因为阿波罗痴迷地降低了风险。其成功似乎确认风险分析是不合理的悲观，并且良好的工程可以克服风险。这种理解造成在航天飞机工程期间增加的风险，并导致不必要的危险方法。梭设计在燃料箱旁边的脆弱航天器放置，未能提供船员逃生或启动中止。这些设计决策直接导致挑战者和哥伦比亚悲剧。在挑战者之后，重新建立风险分析。目前的火箭和胶囊设计确实认为风险，结果强烈类似于阿波罗。阿波罗宣传LED美国宇航局放弃风险分析，这是梭龙台的最终原因。在利用系统工程的理想组织中，可以防止风险，成本和时间表的过度倡导，以使系统工程具有理性和公平的决策。然而，大多数真实组织使用经常被描述为“系统”的非正式方法，适应人类和团体需求。人类有偏见，使用天生的决策制作启发式，本能地依靠“肠道感”，并通过Groupthink建立异常集团。期望组织变得完全理性是不切实际的，但忽视风险和低估成本和大肠等特定问题

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