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Concordance among Holdouts

机译：保持之间的一致性

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When no agent; has substantial influence on a public good outcome, he or she can demand the full surplus. Tims, in rich environments, private (voluntary and self-financing) provision of public goods-or bads such as land assembly-to a large number of self-interested citizens is impossible. This holdout problem is well-known and ubiquitous throughout economics: Holdout was first formalized by Cournot [2], and takes its precise modern form in the work of Mailath and Postelwaite [4]. Unlike in classical auction settings, where increasing competition may offset imperfections in market design ([1, 3]), there is no easy way around the necessity of social engineering to solve holdout. Consequently, holdout concerns have informed wide-ranging policy decisions, including eminent domain and corporate takeover laws. In this paper, we study holdout in settings where a good owned by a disparate community of sellers is desired by a buyer only in its entirety; for concreteness, we focus on the particularly salient application of land assembly. In these settings, no mechanism can simultaneously achieve full efficiency and complete individual rationality ([4]). However, as we show, it is possible to strike an attractive balance between these two goals. We propose two desiderata for holdout-alleviating market mechanism design: 1. bilateml efficiency - outcomes should always be as ef- ficient as a bilateral bargain between the prospective buyer and a single agent representing the community of sellers in its entirety and 2. approximate individual rationality - each individual should be assured of receiving as compensation at least an approximation to her value based on all but her own information. As we show, these two properties are mutually consistent. Moreover, they are satisfied by any mechanism in a simple and intuitive Concordance mechanism class that we introduce and characterize.1 Concordance mechanisms are asymptotically efficient under truthful reporting by sellers, and exhibit tradeoff's between incentive-compatibility and budget-balance familiar from auction design. To implement Concordance mechanisms, market organizers do not need to know sellers' subjective valuations; rather, they need only an approximation of each seller's share of the total community value.2 Extensions of our approach yield mechanisms for classical collaboration and public goods problems.
机译：没有代理时；对公共利益有重大影响，他或她可以要求全部盈余。蒂姆斯在富裕的环境中，不可能向大量自私的公民提供私人（自愿和自负盈亏）的公共物品（或土地集结之类的不良物品）。这个坚持问题是众所周知的，并且在整个经济学中无处不在：坚持最早是由古诺[2]形式化的，并在迈拉思和波斯特尔韦特[4]的工作中采用了它的精确现代形式。与经典的拍卖环境不同，在竞争日益激烈的竞争中，竞争可能会抵消市场设计的缺陷（[1，3]），围绕社会工程解决保留问题的必要性没有简单的方法。因此，持续存在的担忧已为广泛的政策决策提供了依据，包括著名的领域和公司接管法律。在本文中，我们研究了在这样的环境中的坚持，即买方完全需要由不同的卖方社区拥有的商品。具体而言，我们专注于土地集会的特别突出的应用。在这些情况下，没有任何一种机制可以同时实现充分的效率和完全的个人理性（[4]）。但是，正如我们所展示的，在这两个目标之间取得平衡是可能的。我们提出了两种缓解拖延的市场机制设计方法：1.双边效率-结果应始终与预期买方和代表整个卖方社区的单个代理商之间的双边讨价还价效率相同； 2.近似个人合理性-应确保每个人都根据自己的信息获得至少与其价值近似的补偿。如我们所示，这两个属性是相互一致的。此外，在我们介绍和表征的简单直观的“协调机制”类中，任何一种机制都对它们感到满意。1在卖方真实举报的情况下，协调机制在渐近有效的情况下是渐近有效的，并且表现出拍卖设计中熟悉的激励相容性和预算平衡之间的折衷。要实施协调机制，市场组织者无需知道卖方的主观估价；相反，他们只需要近似每个卖方在整个社区价值中所占的份额即可。2我们方法的扩展产生了经典合作和公共物品问题的机制。

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