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首页> 外文会议>Public management research conference : Seeking excellence in a time of change >PUBLIC CHOICE AS A THEORY OF GOVERNMENTAL CORRUPTION: BOTH HELP AND HINDRANCE
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PUBLIC CHOICE AS A THEORY OF GOVERNMENTAL CORRUPTION: BOTH HELP AND HINDRANCE

机译：公共选择作为政府腐败的理论：帮助和阻碍

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摘要

Public choice (PC) theory‘s assumptions of egoistic, self-interested, utilitymaximisation by politicians and bureaucrats has in the past been widely used to explain governmental behaviour in western democracies, and as a theoretical foundation for institutional reform. In a sense, PC assumes that all officials are at least potentially corrupt. Against this background, this paper looks at three main issues. Given that principal-agent approaches dominate in international attempts to combat government corruption, the first section reflects on the status of the knowledge which underpins these attempts. With reference to the idea of a social .tipping point‘, the second section discusses questions as to how and why some countries or jurisdictions which are generally perceived to have low levels of corruption, might over time (and perhaps even quite rapidly) display higher levels of corruption. Finally, the third section raises the possibility that the application of public choice theory to institutional reform in countries which have not displayed high levels of corruption may in fact have the reverse effect of raising at least the potential for increasing corruption.
机译：过去，政治家和官僚们对公共选择（PC）理论的利己主义，自私自利，效用最大化的假设已被广泛用于解释西方民主国家的政府行为，并作为制度改革的理论基础。从某种意义上说，PC假定所有官员至少都有潜在的腐败行为。在此背景下，本文着眼于三个主要问题。鉴于委托代理方法在打击政府腐败的国际尝试中占主导地位，因此第一部分介绍了支持这些尝试的知识的地位。关于“社会引爆点”的概念，第二部分讨论有关以下问题：为什么一些通常被认为腐败程度较低的国家或司法管辖区如何以及为什么随着时间的推移（甚至可能很快）显示出更高的腐败程度。腐败程度。最后，第三部分提出了以下可能性：在没有表现出高腐败水平的国家中，将公共选择理论应用于制度改革实际上可能会产生至少增加潜在的增加腐败的反作用。

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