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首页> 外文会议>Symposium on Methods for the Assessment of Structural Integrity of Components and Structures; 20010425; Cambridge; GB >Methods for the Assessment of Structural Integrity of Components and Structures -Regulator's View - Nuclear Applications
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Methods for the Assessment of Structural Integrity of Components and Structures -Regulator's View - Nuclear Applications

机译：构件和结构的结构完整性评估方法-监管者的观点-核应用

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The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) regulates the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom via its Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII). NII oversees a wide range of nuclear sites including Magnox power stations, Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor power stations, a Pressurised Water Reactor and the Sellafield site (over 100 assorted plants). These sites have a wide diversity of structural integrity issues. HSE's and therefore NII's approach to regulation is one of goal setting rather than prescription. All of the licensed sites have a licence with 36 standard conditions. NII's goal setting intent allows each licensee to develop compliance arrangements which best suit their business so that whilst the conditions are the same for each licence the detailed arrangements for meeting these conditions vary from licensee to licensee. HSE has produced a set of Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) which have been published. SAPs are used by NII to establish whether a safety case is adequate. Publishing the SAPs provides transparency to the licensees so that they know what NII expects from them. The SAPs also help to provide a consistent approach from Nil's inspectors. The SAPs cover all the relevant topic areas for nuclear regulation including structural integrity. Unlike the approach used by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission the SAPs do not specify that certain codes or methods must be used. Instead the SAPs provide targets that need to be met by a nuclear safety case. For structural integrity cases these targets vary depending on the contribution that a structure, system or component makes to nuclear safety. For items such as reactor pressure vessels where the vessel is the principal means of ensuring safety a Special Case procedure is followed. Although NII does not demand that specific assessment methods are used it still has to be convinced that a licensee has an adequate safety case. NII therefore challenges new safety cases and methodologies as they are presented. The extent of the challenge will depend on the difference in the current case and methodologies compared to those that have been previously assessed.
机译：健康与安全执行官（HSE）通过其核设施检查局（NII）监管英国的核工业。 NII监督广泛的核电站，包括Magnox电站，先进的气冷堆电站，压水堆和Sellafield电站（100多个配套工厂）。这些站点存在各种各样的结构完整性问题。 HSE和NII的监管方法是目标设定而非处方之一。所有许可站点均具有36个标准条件的许可证。 NII的目标设定意图允许每个被许可方制定最适合其业务的合规性安排，因此尽管每个许可的条件都相同，但满足这些条件的详细安排因被许可方而异。 HSE已制定了一套已发布的安全评估原则（SAP）。 NII使用SAP来确定安全案例是否足够。发布SAP为被许可方提供了透明性，以便他们了解NII对他们的期望。 SAP还帮助Nil的检查员提供一致的方法。 SAP涵盖了与核监管有关的所有相关主题领域，包括结构完整性。与美国核监管委员会使用的方法不同，SAP没有指定必须使用某些代码或方法。相反，SAP提供了核安全案例需要实现的目标。对于结构完整性情况，这些目标因结构，系统或组件对核安全的贡献而异。对于诸如反应堆压力容器之类的容器，该容器是确保安全的主要手段，请遵循特殊情况程序。尽管NII并不要求使用特定的评估方法，但仍必须确信被许可人具有充分的安全案例。因此，NII对新的安全案例和方法提出了挑战。挑战的程度将取决于当前案例和方法与之前评估过的方法和方法的差异。

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