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A Simple Public-Goods Game Based Incentive Mechanism for Resource Provision in P2P Networks

机译：P2P网络中基于公共物品博弈的简单激励机制

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摘要

P2P networks can be thought as common goods in that they rely on voluntary provision of resources from individual peers (storage space or bandwidth, etc.) to support the creation and operation of service in P2P network. But, there exist social dilemma in P2P resource provision: Cooperators produce a valuable common good at some cost to themselves while defectors attempt to exploit the resource without contributing. Thus groups of cooperators are better off than groups of defectors. However, in any mixed group, defectors outperform cooperators and hence the dilemma. In this paper, we propose a P2P resource provision mechanism based on public goods game. The key point of this scheme lies in that: small entry fee is set for all peers, and peers can voluntarily join P2P resource provision system. After entering, each peer can independently choose to provide resource or freeride. Furthermore, some specific cooperators (so-called punishers) can voluntarily punish those defectors, which will bring small punishment cost to those punishers. For evolutionary dynamics, each peer simply imitates the strategy of peer with better utility. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the proposed mechanism can incentivize peers to contribute resource, and the whole P2P network will almost converge to the state of punisher.
机译：P2P网络可被视为普通商品，因为它们依赖于来自各个对等方的自愿资源提供（存储空间或带宽等）来支持P2P网络中服务的创建和运行。但是，P2P资源提供存在社会难题：合作者以某种代价自己产生了宝贵的共同利益，而叛逃者则试图在不做任何贡献的情况下开发资源。因此，合作者群体比叛逃者群体更好。但是，在任何混合群体中，叛逃者的表现都优于合作者，因此造成了两难选择。本文提出了一种基于公益博弈的P2P资源提供机制。该方案的关键在于：对所有对等方都设置了较低的入场费，并且对等方可以自愿加入P2P资源提供系统。进入后，每个对等方可以独立选择提供资源还是随心所欲。此外，一些特定的合作者（所谓的惩罚者）可以自愿惩罚那些叛逃者，这将给惩罚者带来很小的惩罚成本。对于进化动力学，每个对等体仅模仿具有更好效用的对等体策略。理论分析和实验结果表明，该机制可以激励同伴贡献资源，整个P2P网络几乎都将收敛于惩罚者的状态。

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