• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >Officials' promotion likelihood and regional variation of corruption in China.
【24h】

Officials' promotion likelihood and regional variation of corruption in China.

机译：中国官员晋升的可能性和地区差异。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Though more serious during the economic reform than in Mao-era, corruption has not totally got out of hand of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is not too rampant to control and its destructive effects appear to have been limited from impeding the economic growth. To study the "resilience" that the CCP has shown in controlling corruption, this research starts from the point that most local administrators are agent of the central governments and simultaneously principal of their subordinates at lower levels; and the most important incentive driving the local agents in the multi-layered hierarchy is their concern for career advancement.;I argue that the middle level administrators' monitoring of and involvement in corruption is strongly influenced by their prospect of further promotion, or their "promotion likelihood", which is mainly determined by officials' age, education level, local performance, and personal connections with the superiors. Their monitoring effort is lowest and corruption is most likely to be the worst when they have a mediocre likelihood of further promotion. This is because the rising stars often have some distinct advantage that others don't; and the laggards know that their chances of further promotion are nil without much advantage. On the contrary, the mediocre officials believe they have a chance if only some "extra advantage" can be introduced. It becomes worthwhile for them to generate more achievements by all means including corruption and to cultivate more personal connections, possibly by bribes, to obtain a promotion. In brief, there is an "inverse-U" relationship between officials' promotion likelihood and the degree of local corruption. Degree of corruption varies across regions according to the local administrators' career prospects.;The causal mechanism is applied to explain the real estate corruption and office-buying-and-selling cases in recent years, utilizing interview notes of fieldwork in China. I also construct an original dataset of estimated corruption based on provincial level excessive real estate investment between 1995 and 2004. Combining this data with proxies of provincial administrators' promotion likelihood, I statistically test the proposed hypotheses and some existing explanations to corruption.
机译：尽管在经济改革中比在毛时代更严重，但腐败并没有完全摆脱中共的控制。它不太容易控制，其破坏性作用似乎已受阻碍经济增长的限制。为了研究中共在控制腐败方面表现出的“复原力”，本研究从以下角度出发：大多数地方行政管理人员是中央政府的代理人，同时也是下级下属的负责人；而驱动多层代理中的本地代理商的最重要的动机是他们对职业发展的关注。；我认为，中层管理人员对腐败的监视和参与很大程度上受到他们进一步晋升的前景的影响，或者他们的“晋升的可能性”，这主要取决于官员的年龄，受教育程度，当地表现以及与上级的人脉关系。当他们有进一步晋升的可能性不大时，他们的监督工作是最低的，腐败很可能是最糟糕的。这是因为后起之秀通常具有一些其他人没有的明显优势。落后者知道，他们进一步晋升的机会很小，没有太多优势。相反，平庸的官员认为，如果只能引入一些“额外优势”，他们就有机会。他们有必要通过包括腐败在内的各种方式取得更多成就，并可能通过贿赂建立更多的人际关系以获得晋升。简而言之，官员晋升的可能性与当地腐败程度之间存在“反U型”关系。腐败程度因地区管理者的职业前景而异。;因果机制被用来解释近年来的房地产腐败和写字楼购销案件，并利用中国的实地访谈记录。我还根据1995年至2004年间省级房地产投资过多，构建了一个估计的腐败原始数据集。将这些数据与省级管理人员晋升可能性的代表相结合，我对提出的假设和一些现有的腐败解释进行了统计检验。

著录项

  • 作者

    Zhu, Jiangnan.;

  • 作者单位

    Northwestern University.;

  • 授予单位 Northwestern University.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2008
  • 页码 384 p.
  • 总页数 384
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号