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Corner cutting in complex engineering systems: A game theoretic and probabilistic modeling approach.

机译：复杂工程系统中的切角：一种游戏理论和概率建模方法。

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摘要

Corner cutting in complex engineering systems is a significant problem because a departure from project specifications can be the cause of costly system failure. Covert corner cutting by an agent exacerbates the problem because the agent is imposing risks upon the system that management is not aware of and that they would not necessarily accept. The challenge for management (the principal) is to understand how their policies toward the agent (payments, penalties, and inspection) affect the agent's actions, and, in turn, how the agent's actions affect the system's performance. The resulting framework guides management in the setting of their optimal policies for numerous situations, including when the principal prefers illicit agent corner cutting, when the principal is unable to stop the agent from corner cutting, and when the agent is naive and does not react to the principal's incentives.; This dissertation links probabilistic risk analysis and engineering economics with expected-utility decision analysis and the principal-agent framework to create a decision support system for upper management to aid in the optimal setting of the agent's incentives. Probabilistic risk analysis is needed to assess the effect of corner cutting on system performance. Engineering economics converts the effects of corner cutting to its monetary equivalent through cash-flow analysis. Expected-utility decision analysis is used to determine both the principal's and the agent's optimal actions under various conditions, and the principal-agent framework models the interaction between the principal's parameter settings and the agent's decisions and actions.
机译：复杂工程系统中的拐角切割是一个重大问题，因为偏离项目规格可能会导致高昂的系统故障。代理人暗中偷工减料使问题变得更加严重，因为代理人将风险施加给管理层不了解且不一定会接受的系统。管理人员（委托人）面临的挑战是了解他们对代理的政策（付款，罚款和检查）如何影响代理的行为，以及代理的行为又如何影响系统性能。由此产生的框架可指导管理人员针对多种情况设置最佳策略，包括当委托人更喜欢使用非法代理进行拐角切割时，委托人无法阻止代理进行拐角切割时，以及当代理幼稚且不响应时。校长的激励措施。本文将概率风险分析和工程经济学与期望效用决策分析和委托代理框架联系起来，为高层管理人员创建决策支持系统，以帮助最优地设置代理激励机制。需要概率风险分析来评估切角对系统性能的影响。工程经济学通过现金流量分析将切角的影响转换为等价货币。预期效用决策分析用于确定各种条件下的委托人和代理人的最佳行动，而委托人-代理人框架对委托人的参数设置与代理人的决策和行动之间的相互作用进行建模。

著录项

  • 作者

    Garber, Russ Greg.;

  • 作者单位

    Stanford University.;

  • 授予单位 Stanford University.;
  • 学科 Engineering Industrial.; Operations Research.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2007
  • 页码 153 p.
  • 总页数 153
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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