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Essays on Intermediated Corruption, Financial Frictions and Economic Development.

机译：中介腐败，金融摩擦与经济发展论文集。

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摘要

Distortions that affect macroeconomic outcomes are an important avenue through which we can explain differences in cross country output and productivity. In this thesis I concentrate on two types of distortions, political economy and informational distortions. In Chapter one, I build a model of intermediated corruption where interactions between government bureaucrats and those who bribe them are mediated by a third party. I show that intermediation has significant effects on the incidence of corruption and the prices entrepreneurs pay for permits. When corruption is particularly acute, measures that increase the frequency with which government bureaucrats are audited often have the undesirable result of increasing the prevalence of corruption because of intermediation. In Chapter two I explore the link between corruption and inequality by building a model in which tax collectors are corrupt. I find that as inequality increases, the frequency of corrupt transactions increases as well. I also find that where corruption is more severe, because wealthier individuals tend to pay lower taxes, inequality is higher. I perform a few quantitative experiments to better understand this linkage. Chapter three explores distortions that are caused by adverse selection in markets with search frictions. I find that when participants are concerned about the information they reveal through their interactions in the market, the distortions to liquidity are deeper and that equilibrium selection is significantly affected. I also find that markets with reputational concerns are more sensitive to outside shocks.
机译：影响宏观经济结果的扭曲是一个重要的途径，通过它我们可以解释跨国产出和生产率的差异。在这篇论文中，我集中讨论两种类型的扭曲，政治经济学和信息扭曲。在第一章中，我建立了一个中间腐败模型，其中政府官员与行贿者之间的互动是由第三方进行的。我表明，中介活动对腐败的发生和企业家支付许可证的价格具有重大影响。在腐败特别严重的情况下，增加政府官员被审计频率的措施通常会产生不良后果，即由于中介而导致腐败发生率增加。在第二章中，我通过建立税收收集者腐败的模型来探索腐败与不平等之间的联系。我发现随着不平等程度的增加，腐败交易的频率也会增加。我还发现，在腐败更为严重的地方，因为较富裕的人倾向于缴纳较低的税，所以不平等程度也较高。我进行了一些定量实验，以更好地理解这种联系。第三章探讨了由于搜索摩擦导致的市场逆向选择所造成的扭曲。我发现，当参与者担心他们通过市场互动揭示的信息时，流动性的扭曲会更深，均衡选择会受到很大影响。我还发现，受到声誉关注的市场对外部冲击更为敏感。

著录项

  • 作者

    Dusha, Elton.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Toronto (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 University of Toronto (Canada).;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.;Economics Labor.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2013
  • 页码 97 p.
  • 总页数 97
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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