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Zero sum stochastic differential games in weak formulation and related norms for semi-martingales.

机译:弱市场的零和随机微分博弈及其相关规范。

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摘要

In this dissertation, we study three topics under a common theme: nonlinear expectation related to zero-sum stochastic differential games. To develop this nonlinear expectation, we first study the stochastic game problem where both players use feedback controls. This is in contrast with the standard literature where the setting of strategies versus controls is usually used. Such approach has the drawback of creating the asymmetry between the two players. Using feedback controls, we prove the existence of the game value where both players use controls and preserve the symmetry. Moreover, we allow for non-Markovian structure and characterize the value process as the unique viscosity solution of the path-dependent Bellman-Isaacs equation.;Using the dynamic programming principle, the game value process can be viewed as a filtration consistent nonlinear expectation. Moreover, this nonlinear expectation is dominated by the G-Expectation, which is defined naturally from the game setting. It follows that the game value process is a G-submartingale. It is natural to conjecture that a G-submartingale is a semi-martingale under each probability that P composes the G-Expectation. Therefore, we study norm estimate for semi-martingales as our second topic. We introduce two new types of norms. The first characterizes square integrable semi-martingales. The second characterizes the absolute continuity of the finite variation part with respect to the Lebesgue measure. As an application of the first norm, we obtain the Doob-Meyer decomposition for G-submartingale.;Finally, we study the wellposedness problem of doubly reflected Backward Stochastic Differential Equations and establish some a priori estimates for DRBSDEs without imposing the Mokobodski's condition.
机译:本文研究了一个共同主题下的三个主题:与零和随机微分博弈相关的非线性期望。为了发展这种非线性期望,我们首先研究两个参与者都使用反馈控制的随机博弈问题。这与通常使用策略设置和控制设置的标准文献形成对照。这种方法的缺点是在两个参与者之间造成不对称。通过使用反馈控件,我们证明了两个玩家都使用控件并保持对称性时游戏价值的存在。此外,我们考虑了非马尔可夫结构,并将价值过程描述为与路径相关的Bellman-Isaacs方程的唯一粘性解。使用动态规划原理,博弈价值过程可以看作是过滤一致的非线性期望。此外,这种非线性期望值主要由G期望值决定,该期望值是从游戏设置中自然定义的。由此可见,游戏价值过程是一个G-子市场。很自然地推测,在P构成G期望的每种概率下,G-子集市都是半集市。因此,我们将半集市的规范估计作为第二个主题。我们介绍了两种新型的规范。第一个特征是方形可积半-。第二个特征是关于Lebesgue测度的有限变化部分的绝对连续性。作为第一范数的应用,我们获得了G-子集市的Doob-Meyer分解。

著录项

  • 作者

    Pham, Triet M.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Southern California.;

  • 授予单位 University of Southern California.;
  • 学科 Applied Mathematics.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2013
  • 页码 119 p.
  • 总页数 119
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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