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首页> 外文学位 >Corporate layers and corporate transparency in a transition economy: Evidence from China.
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Corporate layers and corporate transparency in a transition economy: Evidence from China.

机译：转型经济中的公司层级和公司透明度：来自中国的证据。

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摘要

With a proprietary data set, this thesis first investigates how corporate layers are determined, after which it analyzes the effects of corporate layers on corporate transparency. In chapter one, I find that corporate layers are set up to limit government control and interference in government-controlled listed companies. I document that the development of markets, legal systems and property rights protection in a region is associated with more corporate layers, limiting the control of government as an ultimate shareholder. Market developments and political incentives to interfere business are associated with fewer layers, allowing government to control the firms through direct ownership. The opposite is true for privately-controlled firms. The lack of development in markets, legal systems and property rights protection is associated with more layers in privately-controlled firms, which are used for hiding the identity and/or wealth of ultimate private owners and shielding them from government predation. In chapter two, listed companies are found to be more transparent when they get away from government through setting up more corporate layers in government-controlled firms. More layers between government agencies and listed companies are associated with stronger earnings-return relation. The corporate layers in government-controlled firms emerge as a mechanism to confine political interference and enhance corporate transparency. In companies controlled by private owners, the earnings do not have any explanatory power for stock returns and corporate layers are not associated with the firms' earnings-return relation.
机译：本文采用专有数据集，首先研究如何确定公司层，然后分析公司层对公司透明度的影响。在第一章中，我发现建立公司层是为了限制政府控制和对政府控制的上市公司的干预。我记录到，一个地区市场，法律制度和产权保护的发展与更多的公司层相关联，从而限制了政府作为最终股东的控制权。市场发展和干扰业务的政治动机与更少的层次相关联，从而允许政府通过直接所有权来控制公司。私营公司则相反。市场，法律制度和产权保护的缺乏发展与私人控制公司的更多层相关，这些公司被用来隐藏最终私人所有者的身份和/或财富，并使他们免受政府的掠夺。在第二章中，发现上市公司通过在政府控制的公司中建立更多的公司层级而远离政府时，其透明度更高。政府机构与上市公司之间的层次越多，收益回报关系越强。政府控制公司中的公司层级成为限制政治干预和提高公司透明度的一种机制。在由私人所有者控制的公司中，收益没有任何关于股票收益的解释力，并且公司层与公司的收益－收益关系不相关。

著录项

  • 作者

    Zhang, Tianyu.;

  • 作者单位

    Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (People's Republic of China).;

  • 授予单位 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (People's Republic of China).;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 79 p.
  • 总页数 79
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;
  • 关键词

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