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首页> 外文学位 >Pricing effects of recognition versus disclosure: Evidence from firms' recognition of employee stock option expense.
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Pricing effects of recognition versus disclosure: Evidence from firms' recognition of employee stock option expense.

机译：确认与披露的定价影响：企业确认员工购股权费用的证据。

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摘要

In this dissertation, I examine whether market prices are affected by the reporting regime of information items, i.e., being recognized in financial statements or only disclosed in footnotes. This investigation is motivated by the ongoing debate over recognition versus disclosure, and the widely held beliefs regarding implications of the Market Efficiency Hypothesis (semi-strong form).; To avoid limitations in prior studies, this study exploits the unique setting stemming from by firms' recognition of Employee Stock Option (ESO) expense with a time-series research design. I find the information content of recognized and disclosed ESO expense is significantly different. Specifically, it appears that investors value ESO expense reported under the recognition regime more as an expense compared with under the disclosure regime.; To ensure that the main result is not driven by contracting theory-related factors, the second set of tests examines market reactions around adoption announcements. The evidence does not support the conjecture that pricing effects of recognition versus disclosure are driven by contracting factors. Overall, the results suggest that the information aggregation process is not completely independent of whether information is recognized or disclosed, which is consistent with the following explanations: (1) informational efficiency in the presence of information costs (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Barth et al., 2003); and (2) limited arbitrage in the presence of noise trading and arbitrage costs (De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990, 1997).
机译：在本文中，我研究了市场价格是否受信息项报告制度的影响，即是否在财务报表中确认或仅在脚注中披露。这项调查的动机是关于承认与披露的持续辩论，以及关于市场效率假说（半强形式）含义的广泛信仰。为避免先前研究的局限性，本研究采用了独特的环境，即企业通过时间序列研究设计来认可员工的股票期权（ESO）费用。我发现已确认和披露的ESO费用的信息内容有很大不同。特别是，与披露制度相比，投资者似乎更认可在确认制度下报告的ESO费用作为一项支出。为确保主要结果不受合同理论相关因素的驱动，第二组测试考察了采用公告前后的市场反应。证据不支持这样一种推测，即确认与披露的定价效应是由收缩因素驱动的。总体而言，结果表明，信息聚合过程并不完全独立于信息是否被识别或披露，这与以下解释一致：（1）在存在信息成本的情况下的信息效率（Grossman和Stiglitz，1980； Barth等）等，2003）； （2）在存在噪声交易和套利成本的情况下进行有限套利（De Long et al。，1990; Shleifer and Vishny，1990，1997）。

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  • 作者

    Zhang, Chunqi.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Berkeley.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Berkeley.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 75 p.
  • 总页数 75
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;
  • 关键词

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