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A mistaken link, divergent paths: Globalization, economic insecurity and social spending (1950--1999).

机译：一个错误的链接，不同的路径：全球化，经济不安全和社会支出（1950--1999年）。

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This dissertation assesses a common assumption in the debates on globalization, namely that increasing exposure to the global economy leads to greater economic risk. With this assumption, scholars of international political economy have advanced a counterintuitive argument: globalization bolsters rather than dismantles the welfare state, as higher economic vulnerability generated by globalization leads to greater demand for social insurance. Known as the compensation hypothesis, the argument has provided an explanation for the simultaneous growth of international trade and government size in the postwar period, one of the central puzzles in international political economy.; Based on the statistical analysis of cross-national economic and individual-level survey data, I demonstrate a significant bifurcation in the effect of international trade on macroeconomic volatility, perceptions of economic insecurity, and government social spending between developed and developing countries. In developed countries, greater economic openness is linked to lower economic volatility and perceptions of less economic insecurity, whereas in developing countries it is linked to higher economic volatility and greater perceived economic insecurity. However, government social spending rises with openness in developed countries but not in developing countries.; These findings cast doubt on the compensation hypothesis. The condition that openness increases economic insecurity, a key link of the compensation logic, is met in developing nations where the outcome---compensatory social spending---does not occur, whereas it is not met in developed countries where social spending increases with openness.; Consistent with an argument that the constraints of the global economy are more salient in developing nations, my findings demonstrate that the competitive pressure from the global economy to reduce social spending outweighs the demand for social insurance in the developing world. My dissertation study, thus, lends support to the growing concern among international development institutions that openness will not work without complementary political and economic institutions that cushion the risks of greater openness. With regard to advanced industrial nations, the findings expose the under-specified nature of the causal mechanism linking greater openness with higher levels of social insurance expenditures.
机译：本文评估了全球化辩论中的一个普遍假设，即增加对全球经济的接触会导致更大的经济风险。在这种假设下，国际政治经济学的学者提出了一种反直觉的论点：全球化支持而不是破坏福利国家，因为全球化带来的更高的经济脆弱性导致对社会保险的更大需求。这种说法被称为补偿假说，为战后国际贸易和政府规模的同时增长提供了解释，这是国际政治经济的中心难题之一。根据对跨国经济和个人调查数据的统计分析，我证明了国际贸易对发达国家和发展中国家之间的宏观经济波动，对经济不安全的认识以及政府社会支出的影响存在重大分歧。在发达国家，更大的经济开放度与较低的经济波动率和对经济不安全感的减少相关，而在发展中国家，则与较高的经济波动率和更大的经济不安全感相关。但是，在发达国家，政府的社会支出会随着开放而增加，而在发展中国家则不会。这些发现使人们对赔偿假说产生怀疑。开放性增加了经济不安全感，这是补偿逻辑的关键环节，这种条件在发展中国家不会得到补偿性社会支出的结果，而在发达国家，随着支出的增加社会性支出就不会得到满足。开放性。我的调查结果表明，全球经济的制约因素在发展中国家更为突出，这表明，全球经济减少社会支出的竞争压力超过了发展中国家对社会保险的需求。因此，我的论文研究为国际发展机构中日益增长的担忧提供了支持，即如果没有能够缓解更大程度开放风险的互补性政治和经济机构，开放就不会起作用。对于先进的工业国家，调查结果暴露了因果机制的未充分说明的性质，该因果机制将更大的开放度与更高水平的社会保险支出联系在一起。

著录项

  • 作者

    Kim, So Young.;

  • 作者单位

    Northwestern University.;

  • 授予单位 Northwestern University.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.; Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2004
  • 页码 137 p.
  • 总页数 137
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;国际法;
  • 关键词

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