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Bayes Rules---A Bayesian-Intuit Approach to Legal Evidence.

机译：贝叶斯规则-一种法律证据的贝叶斯直觉方法。

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摘要

The law too often avoids or misuses statistical evidence. This problem is partially explained by the absence of a shared normative framework for working with such evidence. There is considerable disagreement within the legal community about how statistical evidence relates to legal inquiry. It is proposed that the first step to addressing the problem is to accept Bayesianism as a normative framework that leads to outcomes that largely align with legal intuitions. It is only once this has been accepted that we can proceed to encourage education about common conceptual errors involving statistical evidence as well as techniques to limit their occurrence. Objections to using Bayesianism in the legal context are addressed. It is argued that the objection based on the irrelevance of statistical evidence is fundamentally incoherent in its failure to identify most evidence as statistical. Second, objections to the incompleteness of a Bayesian approach in accounting for non-truth-related values do place legitimate limits on the use of Bayesianism in the law but in no way undermine its normative usefulness. Lastly, many criticisms of the role of Bayesianism in the law rest on misunderstandings of the meaning and manipulation of statistical evidence and are best addressed by presenting statistical evidence in ways that encourage correct understanding. Once it is accepted that, put in its proper place, a Bayesian approach to understanding statistical evidence can align with most fundamental legal intuitions, a less fearful approach to the use of statistical evidence in the law can emerge.
机译：法律经常避免或滥用统计证据。缺乏使用此类证据的共享规范框架可以部分解释此问题。在法律界内部，关于统计证据与法律询问的关系存在很大分歧。建议解决该问题的第一步是接受贝叶斯主义作为一种规范性框架，该框架可导致产生与法律直觉基本一致的结果。只有接受了这一点，我们才能继续鼓励人们对涉及统计证据以及限制其发生的常见概念错误的教育。解决了在法律背景下使用贝叶斯主义的反对意见。有人认为，基于统计证据的不相关性的异议从根本上是不一致的，因为它未能将大多数证据确定为统计证据。其次，对贝叶斯方法在解释与非真理相关的价值时的不完整性提出异议确实对法律中对贝叶斯主义的使用提出了合理的限制，但丝毫没有削弱其贝叶斯主义的规范用处。最后，对贝叶斯主义在法律中的作用的许多批评都基于对统计证据的含义和操纵的误解，最好通过以鼓励正确理解的方式提出统计证据来解决。一旦人们接受了一种贝叶斯方法来理解统计证据，并将其放在最适当的位置，该方法可以与大多数基本的法律直觉相吻合，那么就会出现一种在法律中使用统计证据的恐惧程度较低的方法。

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  • 作者

    Likwornik, Helena Miriam.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Toronto (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 University of Toronto (Canada).;
  • 学科 Law.;Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 207 p.
  • 总页数 207
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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