• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >Three essays on foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties.
【24h】

Three essays on foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties.

机译：关于外国直接投资和双边投资条约的三篇论文。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In the past several decades, a significant, worldwide expansion in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) occurred and aimed to improve protection for foreign investors' rights and induce foreign direct investment (FDI). The assumption is that countries with BITs should have higher levels of FDI than those without them. However, the effects of BITs on FDI are empirically ambiguous. This contradiction motivates the current research. A signaling game-theory model of strategic interaction between a foreign investor and a state hosting an FDI identifies the conditions under which the designs of BITs facilitate FDI. Inherent in the designs of BITs is a tradeoff between the protection of foreign investor's rights and the host state's rights. Due to the investor's uncertainty regarding the host state's environment, a BIT serves as a signaling device, indicating the quality of the latter's investment environment. The stringency of the design features becomes critical to whether or not the foreign investor decides to initiate a new investment project or reinvest earnings. The proposed model contributes to the study of foreign direct investment and international institutions. To test empirically the theoretical implications of the model, this study considers the content of expropriation provisions in 915 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) for the period 1984-2007. The data indicates not only commonalities, but also striking differences in BITs' provisions for protection against expropriation, among treaty obligations, countries, and over time. To identify variations in the protection from expropriation, a newly developed categorization of BITs arises from analyzing the content variations in all obligations regarding expropriation. This study offers a new quantitative measure for the degree of legal protection against expropriation based on the systematic design variations in BITs' expropriation provisions. Empirical analysis uses generalized method of moments (GMM). The empirical findings of the dissertation conform to the theoretical expectations that in high-risk countries, more stringent BITs facilitate FDI inflows, and in low-risk countries, BITs' designs have no statistically significant effect on FDI. The research also suggests that, without more nuanced measures in institutional design variations in BITs, conclusions regarding the causes and effects of BITs can become overly general and biased.
机译：在过去的几十年中，双边投资条约（BITs）在全球范围内发生了重大扩展，旨在改善对外国投资者权利的保护并吸引外国直接投资（FDI）。假定具有BIT的国家的外国直接投资水平应高于没有BIT的国家。但是，双边投资协定对外国直接投资的影响在经验上是模棱两可的。这种矛盾激发了当前的研究。外国投资者与托管外国直接投资的国家之间的战略互动的信号博弈模型确定了BIT设计促进外国直接投资的条件。双边投资协定的设计本身就是在保护外国投资者的权利与东道国的权利之间进行权衡。由于投资者对东道国环境的不确定性，双边投资条约可作为一种信号手段，表明东道国的投资环境质量。设计功能的严格性对于外国投资者是否决定启动新的投资项目或将收益再投资至关重要。所提出的模型有助于外国直接投资和国际机构的研究。为了从经验上检验该模型的理论含义，本研究考虑了1984年至2007年期间的915个双边投资条约中的征收规定的内容。数据不仅表明共同点，而且在条约义务，国家之间以及随着时间的推移，双边投资条约关于防止被征收的规定也存在显着差异。为了确定免遭侵害保护的变化，通过分析与征收有关的所有义务的内容变化，出现了新开发的BIT分类。这项研究基于BITs征收条款的系统设计变化，为针对征收的法律保护程度提供了一种新的量化措施。实证分析使用广义矩量法（GMM）。论文的经验发现符合理论上的预期，即在高风险国家，更严格的双边投资条约可促进外国直接投资的流入，而在低风险国家，双边投资协定的设计对外国直接投资没有统计学上的显着影响。该研究还表明，如果在BITs的制度设计变化中没有采取更细致的措施，关于BITs的原因和结果的结论可能会变得过于笼统和偏颇。

著录项

  • 作者

    Vashchilko, Tatiana.;

  • 作者单位

    The Pennsylvania State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Pennsylvania State University.;
  • 学科 International relations.;Finance.;International law.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 217 p.
  • 总页数 217
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号