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Essays on the economics of television program supply.

机译：电视节目供应经济学散文。

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摘要

In this dissertation, I study the economics of the television program supply market. The market changes considerably in the 1990s. In the first half of the decade, regulatory limits on vertical integration relaxed. Deregulation followed in 1995. The first essay measures the market's response to these regulatory shifts. The market consolidated in ways that would have been prohibited earlier. Networks vertically integrated into the production and ownership of television series. Networks owned 11% of their show-hours in 1991 and 60% in 2001. Also, Hollywood studios and television networks formed tighter ties via merger and entry. These ties contributed to the shrinking of the independent production sector. Its market share fell from 20% in 1991 to less than 10% in 2001. The second essay examines vertical integration and show renewal decisions. A network renews a show more often if it produced it. A dynamic discrete choice model calculates how much vertical integration must be worth for networks to exhibit the degree of self-preference observed in renewal decisions. Vertical integration appears to be worth 20% of the typical new show's budget. The third essay models the search process for new shows. I show that option contracts and renegotiation partially mitigate a market failure caused when networks cannot appropriate all the returns to successful search. Because regulation prevented networks from owning residual rights in much of their programming, networks might have had less incentive to search for highly profitable programs. The data follow this predicted pattern. Networks searched more intensively among new programs after deregulation. Over 40% of externally supplied new shows in 1991–1994 reached a second season, while fewer than 25% did so in 1995–2000.
机译：本文研究了电视节目供应市场的经济学。在1990年代，市场发生了巨大变化。在此十年的上半年，放宽了对垂直整合的监管限制。随后于1995年放松管制。第一篇文章衡量了市场对这些管制转变的反应。市场以早先被禁止的方式进行整合。网络垂直整合到电视剧的制作和所有权中。 1991年和2001年，Networks拥有其11％的放映时间，而好莱坞电影制片厂和电视网络通过合并和进入形成了更紧密的联系。这些联系促成了独立生产部门的萎缩。它的市场份额从1991年的20％下降到2001年的不到10％。第二篇文章探讨了垂直整合并显示了更新决策。如果网络制作了节目，它会更频繁地更新节目。动态离散选择模型计算网络必须具备多少垂直整合才能表现出在更新决策中观察到的自我偏好程度。纵向整合似乎占典型新节目预算的20％。第三篇文章对新节目的搜索过程进行了建模。我证明了期权合同和重新谈判可以部分缓解由于网络无法将所有收益都用于成功搜索而导致的市场失灵。由于法规阻止网络在其大部分节目中拥有剩余权利，因此网络可能没有那么多的动力去寻找高利润的节目。数据遵循此预测模式。放松管制后，网络对新程序的搜索更加密集。 1991–1994年，外部提供的新节目中有40％以上达到了第二季，而1995–2000年只有不到25％达到了第二季。

著录项

  • 作者

    Barth, David Karl.;

  • 作者单位

    Northwestern University.;

  • 授予单位 Northwestern University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.; Mass Communications.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2003
  • 页码 171 p.
  • 总页数 171
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;传播理论;
  • 关键词

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