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Davidson, analyticity, and theory confirmation (Donald Davidson).

机译：戴维森，分析性和理论确认（唐纳德·戴维森）。

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摘要

In this dissertation, I explore the work of Donald Davidson, reveal an inconsistency in it, and resolve that inconsistency in a way that complements a debate in philosophy of science. In Part One, I explicate Davidson's extensional account of meaning; though not defending Davidson from all objections, I nonetheless present his seemingly disparate views as a coherent whole. In Part Two, I explicate Davidson's views on the dualism between conceptual schemes and empirical content, isolating four seemingly different arguments that Davidson makes against the dualism; I demonstrate that, though the arguments fail, each is ultimately meant to rely on his account of meaning.; In Part Three, I show that Davidson's extensional account of meaning gives rise to the analytic-synthetic distinction, while simultaneously needing to reject it. I then propose a resolution to Davidson's dilemma. Rather than treating interpretation of meaning as continuous with the holistic enterprise of science, as Quine treats translation, one should treat it as conceptually prior to science, as Kant treats epistemology. Nonetheless I recognize four reasons why Davidson himself would reject doing so. I therefore propose a view called 'transcendental semantics', based on Davidson's, that accepts my resolution. Further, transcendental semantics, like Kant's own transcendental idealism, posits a single conceptual scheme; nonetheless Kant's is concerned with Newtonian physics, transcendental semantics' with interpretation.; Finally, in Part Four, I show how positing such a scheme allows transcendental semantics to complement a promising neo-Carnapian (and ultimately neo-Kantian) account of theory confirmation in science proposed by Michael Friedman. Scientists are first and foremost interpreters, a fact that allows transcendental semantics to help Friedman establish the possibility of rational continuity through scientific revolutions. In fact, transcendental semantics, by complementing Friedman's project, reunites two of Carnap's own concerns, philosophy of language and philosophy of science. I conclude that philosophy of language without philosophy of science is empty (or at least seems empty to those agreeing with Quine that "philosophy of science is philosophy enough"), while philosophy of science without philosophy of language is blind (not being able to see its way out of the seeming impossibility of rational continuity through scientific revolutions).
机译：在本文中，我探索了唐纳德·戴维森的作品，揭示了其中的矛盾之处，并以补充科学哲学辩论的方式解决了这一矛盾之处。在第一部分中，我阐述了戴维森对意义的延伸性描述。尽管我并未捍卫戴维森免受所有异议，但我还是将他看似不同的观点作为一个连贯的整体提出。在第二部分中，我阐述了戴维森关于概念方案和经验内容之间的二元论的观点，并隔离了戴维森反对二元论的四个看似不同的论点。我证明，尽管争论失败了，但每个争论最终都意味着要依靠他对意义的解释。在第三部分中，我证明了戴维森对意义的扩展解释引起了分析综合区分，同时又需要拒绝它。然后，我提出解决戴维森困境的解决方案。正如奎因对待翻译一样，与其将意义的解释视为与科学的整体事业相伴随的连续性，还不如将康德对待认识论视为一种在概念上先于科学的翻译。尽管如此，我知道戴维森本人会拒绝这样做的四个原因。因此，基于戴维森的观点，我提出了一种称为“超越语义”的观点，该观点接受了我的解决方案。此外，先验语义学，例如康德自己的先验理想主义，提出了一个单一的概念方案。然而，康德与牛顿物理学有关，先验语义与解释有关。最后，在第四部分中，我将展示如何提出这样的方案以超越先验的语义，以补充迈克尔·弗里德曼提出的有前途的新卡纳普主义（最终是新康德主义）的科学理论证明。科学家是最重要的解释者，这一事实使先验语义学可以帮助弗里德曼通过科学革命来确立理性连续性的可能性。实际上，先验语义学通过补充弗里德曼（Friedman）的计划，重新融合了卡尔纳普自己的两个关注点，即语言哲学和科学哲学。我得出的结论是，没有科学哲学的语言哲学是空洞的（或者至少对于那些同意奎因认为“科学哲学足够哲学”的人来说是空洞的），而没有语言哲学的科学哲学是盲目的（无法看清）通过科学革命似乎无法实现理性连续性）。

著录项

  • 作者

    Goldberg, Nathaniel Jason.;

  • 作者单位

    Georgetown University.;

  • 授予单位 Georgetown University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2003
  • 页码 368 p.
  • 总页数 368
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 哲学理论;
  • 关键词

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