Since the end of communism in Central Europe, the former Soviet satellite states have sought closer relations with the West. An immediate goal was membership in NATO. To meet the conditions of membership, the former Warsaw Pact members had to make significant reforms within their defense establishments that would meet NATO's interoperability requirements. Despite the incentive of potential NATO membership, the development and implementation of such reforms has been slow. The objective of this study is to answer the research question, “ Why has defense reform proven so elusive in an environment where key actors agree on the desirability, necessity, and the benefits of its formulation and implementation?”; Through field work, including archival research and interviews with various Hungarian military and governmental officials, and secondary source research, I conclude that the key reasons for slow reform lie in a combination of three factors: (1) the lingering legacies of communist period, (2) the failure of NATO to create incentives for Hungary to undertake reforms necessary to join and integrate its forces within NATO, and (3) the post-communist tendency to subordinate defense policy to shifting partisan interests. As a result of these factors Hungary failed to develop a stable organizational structure that unquestionably demarcates jurisdictions of military officers and civilian officials, to develop defense-related civilian expertise and military officers who are trained for strategic planning, and to allocate sufficient funds by increasing the defense budgets or reallocating the budgets to prioritize the reform programs.; The defense ministry reorganizations in the 1990s created instability in the civilian leadership of the ministry. The reorganizations cost the ministry vital civilian expertise gained through on-the-job training, and ultimately failed to address the most important organizational issue, the integration of the General Staff into the ministry. The failure to develop civilian expertise and to train military officers for strategic planning jeopardized civilian oversight and delayed the development of national security strategies to guide reform planning. Additionally, Hungary's post-communist governments and military failed to allocate sufficient funds for the implementation of several reform programs.
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