Many financial crises have followed programs of macroeconomic stabilization and financial liberalization. The existing literature does not offer a formal and integrated macroeconomic/microeconomic model of financial crises or a model that endogenously relates stabilization-cum-liberalization and financial crises. Part of the reason is that many of these crises seem to have involved “non-rational” behavior, such as euphoric expectations. This dissertation provides behavioral reasons for financial crises by joining New Keynesian tools and Post Keynesian insights within the framework of a macroeconomic Twin Crises model and of a model of Exchange-Rate Based Stabilization. The main argument of the dissertation is that macroeconomic stabilization and financial liberalization contribute to endogenous financial fragility and financial crises because they give agents the opportunity and the incentives to engage in financial activities that are objectively risky, even though seen as prudent by overconfident agents.; An implication of this theoretical conclusion is that financial systems ought to become weaker after stabilization-cum-liberalization raise agents' expectations and increase the opportunities for financial risk-taking. Empirical tests of this hypothesis were carried out using classical regression analysis and “signals methodology” developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) to look for the determinants of bank runs as well as through comparing balance-sheet and income statement ratios of 34 Ecuadorian domestic banks. The tests support the hypothesis that the Ecuadorian financial system, which suffered a major crisis in 1999, became weaker as a consequence of stabilization-cum-liberalization and these weaknesses led to bank runs and capital outflows, thus contributing to the collapse of the currency and the economy.
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机译：许多金融危机遵循了宏观经济稳定和金融自由化的方案。现有文献没有提供金融危机的正式和综合的宏观经济/微观经济模型，也没有提供将稳定化-<斜体>暨<斜体>-自由化与金融危机内在联系起来的模型。部分原因是，许多危机似乎涉及“非理性”行为，例如欣快的期望。本文通过在宏观经济双危机模型和基于汇率的稳定模型的框架内加入新凯恩斯主义工具和凯恩斯主义后见解，为金融危机提供了行为原因。论文的主要论点是，宏观经济稳定和金融自由化助长了内源性金融脆弱性和金融危机，因为它们给代理人提供机会和动机进行客观上有风险的金融活动，即使他们被过分自信的代理人审慎对待。该理论结论的含义是，在稳定化（斜体和斜体）自由化提高了代理商的期望并增加了承担金融风险的机会之后，金融体系应该变得更弱。使用经典回归分析和Kaminsky and Reinhart（1999）开发的“信号方法”对这一假设进行了实证检验，以寻找银行挤兑的决定因素，并通过比较34家厄瓜多尔国内银行的资产负债表和损益表比率。检验结果支持以下假设：厄瓜多尔金融体系在1999年遭受严重危机，由于稳定和自由化而变得脆弱，这些弱点导致银行挤兑和资本外流，从而加剧了货币贬值和货币贬值。经济。
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