Approximately 1,500 years ago John Philoponus proposed a simple argument for the existence of God. The argument runs thus: (1) Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be. (2) The universe came to be. (3) Therefore, the universe has a cause of its coming to be.; Due to the influence of William Lane Craig, this argument and the family of arguments that support it have come to be known as the “kalam” cosmological argument (henceforth KCA). Craig's account of the KCA incorporates features that serve to distinguish his version as a significant advance. First, conceptual advances in mathematics now permit a clearer presentation of the argument than was previously possible. Second, contemporary Big Bang cosmology confirms the central contention of the KCA, namely, that the past existence of the universe is finite. Reflection upon the implications of using Cantorian transfinite mathematics to model physical processes allowed Craig to develop a distinctively philosophical version of the KCA which is relatively independent of changes in contemporary scientific cosmology. This dissertation is intended as a critical investigation and development of this philosophical strand of the KCA. The literature relating to the KCA has grown however to a significant bulk, and there is now danger of duplication and misassessment due to the plurality of interpretations that the argument has received. Part I of the dissertation addresses this need by laying bare the underlying logical structure of the KCA (chapter 1) and by providing a comprehensive “state of the question” (chapter 2). Part II of the dissertation, comprising chapters 3 through 6, focuses upon an important species of objection made to the KCA. This species of objection relies upon thought-experiments designed to show that an actual infinity is possible. I reply: this objection is effectively answered by introducing a metaphysics of substances. In the course of presenting a systematic response I develop an interpretation of the notion of substance that is useful for analytic philosophy, present a general account of the logical requirements of KCA thought-experiments, and outline a theory of logical modality suited to the metaphysical requirements of the KCA.
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机译：大约1500年前，约翰·菲洛波努斯（John Philoponus）提出了关于上帝存在的简单论据。这样的论点是这样的：（1）无论发生什么都有其成因。 （2）宇宙诞生了。 （3）因此，宇宙有其成因。由于威廉·莱恩·克雷格（William Lane Craig）的影响，该论点及其支持的论点家族被称为“卡拉姆”宇宙论论点（以下简称KCA）。克雷格（Kraig）对KCA的叙述结合了一些功能，这些功能可以区分他的版本，这是一项重大进步。首先，数学上的概念性进步现在允许比以前更清晰地表达观点。其次，当代大爆炸宇宙学证实了KCA的核心论点，即宇宙过去的存在是有限的。反思使用Cantorian有限数学对物理过程进行建模的含意，使克雷格（Craig）开发了KCA的独特哲学版本，该版本相对独立于当代科学宇宙论的变化。本文旨在作为对KCA这一哲学链的批判性研究和发展。然而，有关KCA的文献已经大量增加，由于论点已收到多种解释，现在存在重复和错误评估的危险。论文的第一部分通过揭示KCA的基本逻辑结构（第1章）并提供全面的“问题状态”（第2章）来解决这一需求。论文的第二部分，包括第3章至第6章，重点讨论了对KCA的重要异议。这种反对意见依赖于旨在证明实际无限可能的思想实验。我回答：通过提出物质的形而上学可以有效地解决这一反对意见。在提出系统反应的过程中，我对物质概念进行了解释，这对分析哲学很有用，提出了对KCA思想实验逻辑要求的一般解释，并概述了适合形而上学要求的逻辑模态理论KCA。
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