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The politics of institutional choice: International trade and dispute settlement mechanisms.

机译：制度选择的政治：国际贸易和争端解决机制。

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摘要

My dissertation contributes to the literature on the forms of cooperation, an specifically on the creation of international institutions. I study the determinants of state preferences over the dispute settlement mechanisms governing regional integration agreements, and their actual establishment. Three causal mechanisms are explored: functional needs, power asymmetry considerations, and concerns based on asset specificity and related problems of opportunism.; Pride of place is given to the latter causal argument, given it has been the least explored one in the international relations literature on the forms of cooperation. A theory on the creation of international institutions is developed on the basis of the transaction costs economics literature.; A typology of dispute settlement mechanisms is developed, as well as a “vulnerability index” (Vind) that measures the degree of asset specificity involved in economic interactions across borders.; The issues of state preferences and negotiation outcomes are addressed through the statistical analysis of 58 (fifty-eight) regional integration agreements and two case studies: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR).; The main finding is that asset specificity has a limited albeit systematic effect on state preferences and negotiation outcomes regarding the establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms in regional integration agreements. Functional needs play a very limited role in state in institutional creation, while power asymmetry concerns are prevalent mostly where asset specificity levels are low.
机译：我的论文对有关合作形式，特别是关于建立国际机构的文献作出了贡献。我研究了国家对于管辖区域一体化协议的争端解决机制及其实际建立的决定因素。探讨了三种因果机制：功能需求，权力不对称因素以及基于资产专用性和机会主义相关问题的担忧。鉴于后者是因果论证的骄傲，因为它是国际关系文献中关于合作形式的最少探讨。在交易成本经济学文献的基础上发展了关于建立国际机构的理论。发展了争端解决机制的类型，以及“脆弱性指数”（Vind），该指数衡量跨境经济互动中涉及的资产特定程度。通过对58项（58个）区域一体化协议和两个案例研究的统计分析，解决了国家优惠和谈判结果的问题：北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）和南方共同市场（MERCOSUR）。 ;主要发现是，资产专用性虽然对在区域一体化协议中建立争端解决机制的国家偏好和谈判结果产生系统性影响，但作用有限。功能需求在制度创建中的状态中起着非常有限的作用，而权力不对称性问题普遍存在于资产特定性水平较低的地方。

著录项

  • 作者

    Ortiz Mena Lopez Negrete, Antonio.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, San Diego.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, San Diego.;
  • 学科 Political Science International Law and Relations.; Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2001
  • 页码 454 p.
  • 总页数 454
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 国际法;政治理论;
  • 关键词

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