• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >The rule of law is the tip of the iceberg: Political responses to interpretive decisionmaking in United States criminal procedure, federal preemption, and international finance.
【24h】

The rule of law is the tip of the iceberg: Political responses to interpretive decisionmaking in United States criminal procedure, federal preemption, and international finance.

机译：法治是冰山一角：对美国刑事诉讼，联邦先发制人和国际金融中的解释性决策的政治反应。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Interpretive decisionmakers are entities given public power yet designed to work ostensibly outside the confines of politics. The U.S. Supreme Court, one such decisionmaker, formally has the last word when it comes to interpreting the Constitution. Yet if the Court makes an unpopular decision---such as expanding the rights of criminal suspects and defendants---politicians can still use their control over funding, substantive law, and other resources to minimize the impact of the decision even as they comply with the letter of the rule of law. The possibility of political responses to constitutional criminal procedure highlights a recurring problem in domestic and international law and politics. While most talk about the rule of law focuses on whether an interpretive decision is followed, an equally pertinent question is whether the decision produces a countervailing political response.; This dissertation develops and tests a theory of political responses to interpretive decisionmaking. Chapter 1 explains the problem and reviews the literature, finding that a number of schools of thought implicitly assume that political responses either do not exist or do not matter. Chapter 2 develops a formal theory of political responses to interpretive decisionmaking, using a two-dimensional spatial model to define outcomes as a function of an interpretive and a policy dimension. Chapter 3 applies the theory to constitutional criminal procedure doctrine in the U.S. Late 19th century criminal procedure restricted federal power to obtain documents and testimony, creating problems for business regulatory enforcement. When economic regulation became politically popular the court retreated from its restrictive doctrine, avoiding the risk of a political confrontation. Eventually this doctrine stopped impeding regulation and became a tool for judges to oversee police enforcement of traditional street, drug, and property crimes. This shift engendered a considerable political response amid rising crime rates, in the form of funding and substantive criminal law changes working against the new procedural rights. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the theory is widely applicable by showing its relevance to federal preemption of state environmental law (contributing to lower landfill disposal capacity) and to the law and politics of International Monetary Fund decisions (contributing to slower structural adjustment and heightened corruption). Chapter 5 considers normative implications of domestic and international political responses to interpretive decisionmaking, focusing on the responses' tendency to help solve interpreters' recurring problem of democratic legitimacy while diminishing their ability to protect unpopular minorities or force difficult short-term decisions with larger long-term payoffs. Because the players generally cannot coordinate their moves, the outcomes tend to be more extreme than either player would like. Despite these limitations, interpreters can make public discourse more pluralistic, and contribute to the development of effective political and economic institutions. Yet interpreters must be politically strategic as well as normative in order to play these roles. If this makes interpreters a bit less unique, perhaps they will also feel a bit less alone.
机译：解释性决策者是具有公共权力但实际上在政治范围之外工作的实体。美国最高法院就是这样一个决策者，在解释《宪法》时正式拥有最终决定权。但是，如果法院做出不受欢迎的决定（例如扩大犯罪嫌疑人和被告的权利），则政治家仍然可以利用对资金，实体法和其他资源的控制权，即使他们遵守了该决定，也可以将其影响最小与法治之书。对宪政刑事程序作出政治回应的可能性凸显了国内外法律和政治中反复出现的问题。虽然大多数关于法治的讨论都集中在是否遵循解释性决定上，但同样相关的问题是该决定是否产生了反作用的政治反应。本文发展并检验了对解释性决策的政治反应理论。第一章解释了这个问题并回顾了文献，发现许多流派都暗中假设政治反应要么不存在，要么不重要。第2章使用二维空间模型将结果定义为解释性和政策性的维度，从而发展了对解释性决策做出政治反应的形式理论。第3章将这一理论应用于美国的宪法刑事诉讼学说.19世纪末，刑事诉讼限制了联邦政府获取文件和作证的权力，给商业监管执法带来了麻烦。当经济法规在政治上变得流行时，法院从其限制性原则中撤回，避免了政治对抗的风险。最终，这一学说不再阻碍法规的制定，并成为法官监督警察对传统街头，毒品和财产犯罪进行执法的工具。在犯罪率不断上升的情况下，这一转变引起了相当大的政治反应，采取的形式是资金和实质性刑法的变更，这些都是与新的程序权利相抵触的。第四章通过论证该理论与联邦对州环境法律的先发制人（有助于降低垃圾掩埋能力）和国际货币基金组织决定的法律和政治（有助于减缓结构调整和加剧腐败）的相关性，证明了该理论的广泛适用性。第5章考虑了国内和国际政治应对措施对解释性决策的规范性含义，着眼于应对趋势有助于解决口译员反复出现的民主合法性问题，同时削弱了他们保护不受欢迎的少数群体或以较大的长期性来迫使困难的短期决策的能力。定期收益。因为玩家通常无法协调他们的动作，所以结果往往比任何一个玩家都希望的更为极端。尽管有这些限制，但口译员可以使公共话语更加多元化，并为有效的政治和经济制度的发展做出贡献。然而，口译员必须在政治上具有战略性和规范性，才能发挥这些作用。如果这使口译员的独特性降低了，也许他们也会感到不那么孤独。

著录项

  • 作者

    Cuellar, Mariano-Florentino.;

  • 作者单位

    Stanford University.;

  • 授予单位 Stanford University.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.; Law.; Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2001
  • 页码 395 p.
  • 总页数 395
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;法律;国际法;
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号