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Accountability and discretion in the age of contracting: When and why do public managers implement sanctions for unsatisfactory contract performance?

机译：签约时代的问责制和自由裁量权：公共管理者何时以及为何对不满意的合同绩效实施制裁？

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摘要

During the last thirty years, one of the most consequential developments in the field of public administration --- contracting --- has proliferated throughout government. Regardless of the type of public program, governments have increased their reliance on private and nonprofit agents to deliver goods and services to citizens. As a result, contracting and other market-based strategies have replaced traditional bureaucratic models of public service delivery. Yet there is a dearth of scholarly research on the critical decisions made by public managers throughout the contract implementation process --- decisions that can have a profound impact on the quality of services delivered to citizens and on the accountability of contractors to the public interest.;This research addresses the accountability dynamics in government contracting, specifically in the decisions public managers make to determine whether, how much, and under what circumstances they sanction contractors for poor performance. This is one of the first studies to address contract sanctions in the context of implementation and not simply in terms of contract design and specification.;Contracting can pose significant challenges to democratic control (Cohen & Eimicke, 2008; Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Nlilward, 19%), particularly when results are emphasized at the expense of democratic process (Chan & Rosenbloom, 2010; Durant, 1999). Public accountability is also compromised when inefficiencies, corruption, and vendor opportunism result from government contracts (Cohen & Eimicke, 2008). In light of these challenges to the value of contracts, understanding the use of contract sanctions - and the determinants of their application - can elucidate both the decision-making process and as importantly, the influence of this action on service quality and public accountability.;Public managers have powerful tools available, especially in the form of sanctions, but the results of this study indicate that other factors prohibit their execution - namely the burdensome nature of the sanctioning process, the amount of discretion managers use, and the extent to which the organization is dependent on the poor performing contractor. This research contributes to an understanding of these impediments and how they compromise accountability by offering a new appreciation of the complexities of maintaining accountability in third party governance.
机译：在过去的三十年中，公共行政领域最重大的发展之一-承包制-在整个政府中激增。无论公共计划的类型如何，政府都越来越依赖私人和非营利性代理商向公民提供商品和服务。结果，合同制和其他基于市场的战略已经取代了传统的官僚主义的公共服务提供模式。然而，关于公共管理人员在合同实施过程中做出的关键决定的学术研究很少，这些决定可能对提供给公民的服务质量以及承包商对公共利益的责任产生深远影响。 ；这项研究解决了政府合同制中的问责制动态问题，特别是在公共管理人员决定是否，在什么情况下以及在何种情况下以不良表现制裁承包商的决策中。这是在执行的背景下而不是仅仅在合同设计和规格方面解决合同制裁的第一批研究之一;合同可能给民主控制带来重大挑战（Cohen＆Eimicke，2008; Johnston＆Romzek，1999; Nlilward ，占19％），尤其是在强调结果而牺牲民主进程的情况下（Chan＆Rosenbloom，2010； Durant，1999）。当政府合同导致效率低下，腐败和供应商机会主义时，公共问责制也会受到损害（Cohen＆Eimicke，2008）。鉴于合同价值面临的这些挑战，了解合同制裁的使用方式及其适用的决定因素可以阐明决策过程，并且更重要的是，可以阐明该行动对服务质量和公共责任的影响。公共管理人员拥有强大的工具，尤其是以制裁的形式，但这项研究的结果表明，其他因素也禁止其执行-即制裁过程的繁琐性质，管理人员使用的酌处权的数量以及制裁的程度。组织取决于业绩不佳的承包商。这项研究通过重新认识到在第三方治理中维持问责制的复杂性，有助于理解这些障碍以及它们如何损害问责制。

著录项

  • 作者

    Girth, Amanda M.;

  • 作者单位

    American University.;

  • 授予单位 American University.;
  • 学科 Public administration.;Public policy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 页码 212 p.
  • 总页数 212
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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