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Venture capital: Entrepreneurial venture's financing and equity selling during the IPO.

机译:风险投资:创业期间首次公开募股的融资和股权出售。

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摘要

This dissertation examines three aspects of the venture capital market: first, the distinctive features of the venture capital market; second, the choice of the appropriate financial instrument used by the venture capitalist to nurture his investee; finally, the determination of proportion of the equity sold during the initial public offering (IPO).; Chapter one describes and analyzes the distinctive attributes of the venture capital market and provides systematic answers about the role of the venture capitalist in structuring a deal with the entrepreneur. To highlight the description and analysis, we use the Canadian data. In this chapter, we focus on the key aspects of the venture captial market.; Chapter two analyzes the role of equity, debt and convertible debt contract in venture capital finance. In this chapter, we find that while the three financial contracts pool entrepreneurs' abilities, only the equity contract enables the venture capitalist to achieve the highest profit. We also show that whatever the financial instrument used to finance the high ability entrepreneur, the venture capitalist ends up with the same profit. We also find that the proportion of the high ability entrepreneurs required to achieve the equivalent result between the pooling profit and the high ability entrepreneurs profit is less in the equity contract than in the two other contracts. These results are consistent with the more intangible nature of the asset financed by the venture capitalist.; Chapter three focuses on the decision of the IPO mechanism. In particular, we examine how the venture capitalist or the issuing firm determines the fraction of the common stock to put up during the IPO. We show that a venture capitalist whose investee venture has a high value sells a lower proportion of his investee equity in the asymmetrical information than in the full information. As for the venture capitalist whose investee has low value, we find that the prevailing information has no impact on the fraction of equity he puts up during the IPO. This result is consistent with the only separating equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion.
机译:本文从风险投资市场的三个方面入手:第一,风险投资市场的特点。第二,选择风险资本家用来培育其投资对象的适当金融工具;最后,确定首次公开募股(IPO)期间出售的股权比例。第一章描述和分析了风险投资市场的独特属性,并提供了有关风险资本家在与企业家达成交易中的作用的系统性答案。为了突出说明和分析,我们使用了加拿大数据。在本章中,我们重点介绍风险资本市场的关键方面。第二章分析了股权,债务和可转换债务合同在风险资本融资中的作用。在本章中,我们发现虽然三个金融合同汇集了企业家的能力,但只有股权合同才能使风险投资家获得最高利润。我们还表明,无论用于资助高技能企业家的金融工具是什么,风险资本家最终都会获得相同的利润。我们还发现,在股权合同中,要想实现集资利润和高技能企业家利润之间的等价结果,需要高技能企业家的比例要比其他两个合同要少。这些结果与风险资本家融资的资产的更无形的性质是一致的。第三章着重于IPO机制的决策。特别是,我们研究了风险资本家或发行公司如何确定IPO期间要发行的普通股的比例。我们证明,在不对称信息中,其被投资方风险较高的风险资本家出售其被投资方股权的比例低于全部信息。对于被投资方价值较低的风险资本家,我们发现主要信息对他在IPO期间投入的股权比例没有影响。该结果与唯一符合直观标准的分离平衡相一致。

著录项

  • 作者

    Ayayi, Ayi.;

  • 作者单位

    Universite de Montreal (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 Universite de Montreal (Canada).;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2000
  • 页码 86 p.
  • 总页数 86
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财政、金融;
  • 关键词

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