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Process, politics and institutions: Three essays in formal theory on comparative institutions

机译：程序，政治和制度：比较制度形式理论中的三篇论文

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摘要

The first essay is concerned with the effects of executive veto powers and compares two types of veto powers, the line-item veto and the package veto, when the legislature is concerned with both public and private goods. I show that the different veto powers lead to different political strategies and, consequently, different policy outcomes. The policy outcomes do not only differ in terms of spending but also in terms of the division of total spending on public and private goods and therefore raise concerns about efficiency and welfare-consequences.;The second essay is on political competition, more specifically on run-off elections under majority rule where candidates face no thresholds to entry in subsequent ballots. The model examines how coordination takes place under perfect information. I characterize and solve for all pure strategy equilibria of the game, and for mixed strategy equilibria in three-candidate run-offs. The framework I adopt here can also be applied to the study of primaries and polling in which similar sorts of coordination take place.;In the final essay I look at party cohesion and dissent in parliamentary systems from an informational perspective. Why dissent occurs in parliamentary systems is in some ways a dilemma as in many parliamentary systems the legislators rely on their party label for reelection and the party's reputation for cohesion has been documented to be a valuable electoral asset. Hence, both the individual legislator and the party suffer if dissent occurs. The explanation offered here focuses on informational gains via dissent. It is assumed that each legislator has better knowledge of his constituency's preferences than the Cabinet. By dissenting the legislator can credibly, albeit not without cost, signal information about his constituency to the Cabinet. Dissent can thus serve to better calibrate the Cabinet's policies with the electorate's preferences. The likelihood of dissent is also related to the legislators' electoral strength and the cost of dissent.
机译：第一篇文章涉及行政否决权的影响，并比较了立法机关同时关注公共和私人物品时，否决权的两种类型，即行权否决权和一揽子否决权。我表明，不同的否决权会导致不同的政治战略，从而导致不同的政策结果。政策结果不仅在支出方面有所不同，而且在公共和私人物品上的总支出分配方面也有所不同，因此引起了人们对效率和福利后果的关注。第二篇文章是关于政治竞争的，更具体地说是在运行中在多数人统治下进行非公开选举，候选人无需面对进入后续投票的门槛。该模型检查了在完美信息下如何进行协调。我描述并解决了游戏中所有纯策略上的平衡问题，并解决了三个候选者中的混合策略下的平衡问题。我在这里采用的框架还可以应用于进行类似协调的初选和民意调查。在最后的文章中，我从信息的角度考察了政党在议会体系中的凝聚力和反对意见。在某些情况下，为什么在议会系统中产生异议是一个两难选择，因为在许多议会系统中，立法者依靠其政党标签进行连任，而该党在凝聚力方面的声誉已被证明是宝贵的选举资产。因此，如果发生异议，个人立法者和政党都会受苦。这里提供的解释集中于通过异议获得信息。假定每个立法者都比内阁更了解其选区的偏好。通过反对立法者可以可信地（尽管并非没有代价）将有关其选区的信息传达给内阁。因此，异议人士可以根据选民的喜好更好地调整内阁政策。异议的可能性也与立法者的选举实力和异议的成本有关。

著录项

  • 作者

    Indridason, Indridi Haukur.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Rochester.;

  • 授予单位 University of Rochester.;
  • 学科 Political science.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2000
  • 页码 141 p.
  • 总页数 141
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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