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Regulating China's state enterprises: Environmental policy as a bargaining game.

机译:规范中国国有企业:环境政策作为讨价还价的游戏。

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摘要

This study proposes a new conceptual framework for analyzing the environmental regulation of state enterprises in China. It characterizes the regulatory relationship as a complex bargaining process between powerful local governments and relatively autonomous state-owned enterprises. The bargaining involves economic as well as environmental variables and leads to case-by-case solutions rather than the uniform application of anonymous laws. Based on this framework, the study derives a number of hypotheses about the forces that drive the environmental performance of state enterprises and subsequently tests them with econometrical methods. More specifically, the study finds that old and loss-making enterprises receive easier regulatory treatment. In addition, regulators whose budget is tightly constrained tend to apply relatively lax environmental regulations and may exempt many enterprises from regulation altogether.; The study recognizes the obvious shortcomings in China's environmental performance. However, it argues that it is insufficient to focus exclusively on either enforcement problems or the design flaws of individual policies. By contrast, the study identifies some of the macroeconomic and institutional factors that constrain the ability of policy makers to effectively address China's environmental problems. In particular, the study points to the extreme decentralization of the Chinese bureaucracy which has local authorities deal with environmental problems that extend far beyond their own territory. Moreover, the regulation of loss-making state enterprises poses numerous problems. Many local authorities are operating on a tight budget and are unable to sufficiently subsidize such enterprises to ensure their compliance with environmental targets. The fact that loss-making enterprises have private information about their abatement costs aggravates the situation, since it gives the enterprises an opportunity to capture information rents from the regulator. Finally, the application of clean technologies in loss-making enterprises proves difficult because of the great informational asymmetries involved.
机译:这项研究为分析中国国有企业的环境法规提出了一个新的概念框架。它把监管关系描述为强大的地方政府与相对自治的国有企业之间的复杂讨价还价过程。讨价还价涉及经济和环境变量,并导致个案解决方案,而不是统一适用匿名法。在此框架的基础上,研究得出了许多有关推动国有企业环境绩效的因素的假设,并随后使用计量经济学方法对其进行了检验。更具体地说,该研究发现,亏损的老企业将获得更容易的监管待遇。此外,预算受到严格限制的监管机构往往会采用相对宽松的环境法规,并可能使许多企业完全不受监管。该研究认识到中国环境绩效的明显缺陷。但是,它认为仅关注执法问题或单个策略的设计缺陷是不够的。相比之下,该研究确定了一些宏观经济和制度因素,这些因素限制了决策者有效解决中国环境问题的能力。这项研究特别指出了中国官僚机构的极端权力下放,使地方当局处理的环境问题远远超出了他们自己的领土。而且,对亏损的国有企业的监管还存在许多问题。许多地方当局的预算很紧,无法为这类企业提供足够的补贴,以确保它们遵守环境目标。亏损企业拥有有关其减排成本的私人信息的事实加剧了这种情况,因为这使企业有机会从监管机构那里获取信息租金。最后,由于涉及巨大的信息不对称性,在亏损企业中应用清洁技术被证明是困难的。

著录项

  • 作者

    Wiesmann, Jurgen.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.;

  • 授予单位 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.;
  • 学科 Economics General.; Political Science Public Administration.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1999
  • 页码 115 p.
  • 总页数 115
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;政治理论;
  • 关键词

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