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Speed bumps and roadblocks: Procedural controls and regulatory change.

机译：减速带和障碍：程序控制和法规变更。

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摘要

This work is an attempt to evaluate procedural controls that politicians use to constrain bureaucratic discretion. Political scientists have asserted that procedural controls allow enacting coalitions of politicians to influence future bureaucratic decisions. Administrative law scholars have asserted that procedural controls have "ossified" the rulemaking process and as a result, bureaucrats now avoid rulemaking. This work casts doubt on both of these assertions.; I examine eight case studies of state licensing of child care facilities. In these eight states, procedural controls appear to have little effect on the pace of regulatory change. Bureaucrats are not avoiding rulemaking in the face of a procedure laden environment. The only control that enacting coalitions can use to deter future change and influence future policy is statutory specificity. The remainder of the controls I study, an office to review rules, requirements for analysis or participation, and mandatory reviews of rules all have minimal effects on the pace and substance of regulatory change.; One important reason that procedural controls do not deter regulatory change or ensure the desires of enacting coalitions is that they are in the control of existing coalitions. In the case studies presented here, existing coalitions and interest groups emerge as the most important influences in the bureaucratic environment. The effect that procedural controls have is determined largely by the choice of existing coalitions on how to use them.; When enacting coalitions pass a statute, they have three choices. They can place as much detail as possible in the statute and minimize the choices left to bureaucrats. They can put in place procedures that they hope will constrain future bureaucratic decisions. Or, they can leave bureaucrats a great deal of discretion to make policy choices. The primary finding of this work is that the second and third choices are extremely similar.
机译：这项工作是试图评估政治家用来限制官僚自由裁量权的程序控制。政治学家断言，程序控制允许制定政客联盟来影响未来的官僚决策。行政法学者断言，程序控制使规则制定过程“僵化”，结果，官僚们现在避免规则制定。这项工作对这两个主张都产生了怀疑。我研究了八项关于托儿设施国家许可的案例研究。在这八个州中，程序控制似乎对法规变更的速度影响很小。面对充满程序的环境，官僚们不会回避规则制定。法定联盟可以用来阻止未来的变化并影响未来的政策的唯一控制权是法定特殊性。我研究的其余控制措施，一个审查规则的办公室，分析或参与的要求以及对规则的强制性审查，对法规变更的速度和实质影响最小。程序控制不能阻止法规变更或确保建立联盟的愿望的重要原因之一是，它们在现有联盟的控制之下。在这里介绍的案例研究中，现有的联盟和利益集团成为官僚环境中最重要的影响力。程序控制所产生的效果在很大程度上取决于对如何使用它们的现有联盟的选择。颁布联盟通过法规时，他们有三种选择。他们可以在法规中尽可能多地保留细节，并尽量减少官僚们的选择。他们可以制定程序，希望这些程序可以限制将来的官僚决策。或者，他们可以让官僚们有更多的自由裁量权来做出政策选择。这项工作的主要发现是第二和第三选择极为相似。

著录项

  • 作者

    Shapiro, Stuart Orin.;

  • 作者单位

    Harvard University.;

  • 授予单位 Harvard University.;
  • 学科 Political Science Public Administration.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1999
  • 页码 240 p.
  • 总页数 240
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;
  • 关键词

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