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首页> 外文学位 >When metaphors bewitch, analogies illustrate, and logic fails: Controversies over the use of metaphoric reasoning in philosophy and science.
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When metaphors bewitch, analogies illustrate, and logic fails: Controversies over the use of metaphoric reasoning in philosophy and science.

机译：当隐喻迷惑时，类比说明，逻辑失败：关于在哲学和科学中使用隐喻推理的争议。

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摘要

I begin by investigating the conventional view of the relationship between metaphor and natural kinds in both classical and contemporary philosophy of science. I argue that Plato and Aristotle originated the conventional view that metaphors are a peripheral and ornamental supplement to philosophical and scientific argumentation proper. On their accounts philosophy and science are supposed to be about tracing the causal and logical (as opposed to the metaphorical and analogical) connections between the objects of knowledge. Because metaphors are seen as improper categorizations made merely for the purposes of rhetorical persuasion, metaphors are considered obstacles to proper philosophical and scientific argumentation. The exclusion of metaphor from argumentation supposedly gives us a realist system of philosophy and science which takes as its objective the discovery of natural kinds alleged to be independent of human conceptualization, thereby "cleaving nature at the joints" (in Plato's notorious phrase). However I argue not only is that attempt deeply mistaken in light of the contemporary research within the cognitive sciences on metaphor, but that by analyzing the metaphors that Plato and Aristotle in fact use we can see that metaphor and metaphoric reasoning is itself what makes possible their shared view that metaphor is to be excluded from philosophy and science.;Having shown how Plato's and Aristotle's treatment of metaphor is caught in a strange loop---where some metaphors in their views of philosophy and science are used to argue for the exclusion of metaphor in general from the future practice of science and philosophy---I reject realism about natural kinds in favor of the embodied pragmatism espoused first by Dewey and currently by Lakoff and Johnson. I argue that Dewey provides an alternative metaphysical framework to realism that is crucial for recent work by the neuroscientists Damasio and Edelman on the role of embodiment in the philosophy of cognitive science. I then use that Deweyan framework to both extend and critique Lakoff and Johnson's hypothesis that human reasoning--- including scientific and philosophical reasoning---is constituted by embodied conceptual metaphors. I conclude that neither metaphor nor rhetoric are incidental to philosophical and scientific argumentation.
机译：首先，我将研究古典和当代科学哲学中关于隐喻与自然物种之间关系的传统观点。我认为，柏拉图和亚里士多德起源于传统观点，即隐喻是对哲学和科学论证本身的外围和装饰性补充。从他们的观点来看，哲学和科学被认为是追寻知识对象之间的因果关系和逻辑关系（相对于隐喻和类比）。由于隐喻被视为仅出于修辞说服性的目的而进行的不正确分类，因此隐喻被视为阻碍适当的哲学和科学论证的障碍。从论证中排除隐喻应该给我们提供了一个现实主义的哲学和科学体系，该体系以发现据称独立于人类概念化的自然物种为目标，从而“割裂了自然界”（用柏拉图臭名昭著的话）。但是，我不仅认为，这种尝试不仅因隐喻的认知科学领域的当代研究而被严重误解，而且通过分析柏拉图和亚里士多德实际上使用的隐喻，我们可以看到隐喻和隐喻推理本身就是使它们成为可能的原因。共有观点认为隐喻应被排除在哲学和科学之外。;已经表明了柏拉图和亚里士多德对隐喻的处理是如何陷入一个奇怪的循环中的-在他们的哲学和科学观点中有些隐喻被用来排除通常从科学和哲学的未来实践中隐喻一个隐喻-我拒绝自然界的现实主义，而赞成杜威首先提出，现在由拉科夫和约翰逊提出的具体实用主义。我认为杜威提供了一种替代现实主义的形而上学框架，这对于神经科学家达马西奥（Damasio）和爱德曼（Edelman）在认知科学哲学中体现化的作用的最新工作至关重要。然后，我使用Deweyan框架来扩展和批判Lakoff和Johnson的假设，即人类推理-包括科学和哲学推理-是由具体的概念隐喻构成的。我的结论是，隐喻和修辞都不是哲学和科学论证附带的。

著录项

  • 作者

    Rohrer, Timothy Charles.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Oregon.;

  • 授予单位 University of Oregon.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.;Language General.;Psychology Cognitive.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1998
  • 页码 297 p.
  • 总页数 297
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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