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Labor quality upgrading and restrictive hiring practices in union workplaces.

机译：工会工作场所的劳动质量提升和限制性雇用实践。

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摘要

This dissertation is concerned with the issue of rationing of scarce union jobs. A number of alternative rationing devices are possible: a simple lottery, job queues and positive selection. The conjecture that unionized employers upgrade the quality of labor they hire (positive selection) appears frequently in the literature. This dissertation addresses two questions: (1) What is the impact of the locus of hiring control (employer or union) on quality upgrading in unionized jobs? (2) What determines the locus of union control?;The literature has assumed implicitly that unions have no incentive to upgrade labor quality. A model of hiring by unions is used to show that incumbent workers in a unionized firm would upgrade quality of new hires as long as they attach more value to their own rents than to the rents of newcomers. The hypothesis suggested by this analysis, that upgrading in union-controlled-hiring situations is less than or equal to that in employer-controlled-hiring situations, is tested using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys. The results indicate that upgrading of labor quality does not differ across union-controlled and employer-controlled sectors.;If quality upgrading does not differ by sector, what explains the union's desire to control hiring? It is hypothesized that concerns about job security, particularly in high turnover situations, leads a union to push for control over hiring. Whether or not the union succeeds in obtaining control depends on whether the employer's disutility from such control, as well as on the bargaining power of the two parties. A Nash bargaining model suggests that the probability that a union controls hiring is related positively to its utility and negatively to the employer's disutility from such control. The effect of union power is ambiguous. These hypotheses are tested with interindustry data on the prevalence of the closed shop in 1946, the year before it was made illegal (Taft-Hartley Act), and of hiring clauses in union contracts in 1979. The results strongly support the hypothesis that unions tend to control hiring in situations of high job turnover.
机译：本文涉及的是稀缺工会工作的定量分配问题。可以使用多种替代配给设备：简单的彩票，工作队列和肯定的选择。文献中经常出现这样的猜想：工会雇主提高了他们雇用的劳动质量（积极选择）。本文解决了两个问题：（1）雇用控制（雇主或工会）所在地对工会工作质量的提升有何影响？ （2）是什么决定了工会控制的根源？；文献隐含地假设工会没有动力来提高劳动质量。工会雇用的模型用来表明，有工会组织的公司中的现任工人只要提高对自己租金的价值而不是对新移民的租金的重视，就会提高新员工的素质。该分析提出的假设是，在国家工会纵向调查的数据中检验了工会控制的雇佣情况下的升级小于或等于雇主控制的雇佣情况下的升级。结果表明，在工会控制和雇主控制的部门中，劳动力质量的提升没有差异;如果各部门的质量提升没有差异，那么为什么工会希望控制雇用呢？据推测，对工作安全的担忧，特别是在高离职率的情况下，导致工会推动对雇用的控制。工会能否成功获得控制权取决于雇主是否对这种控制权无用，还取决于两方的议价能力。 Nash讨价还价模型表明，工会控制雇用的可能性与其效用正相关，而与雇主对这种控制的无用负相关。工会权力的影响是模棱两可的。这些假设用行业间的数据进行了检验，这些数据涉及关闭的商店在1946年（即被禁止为非法的前一年（《塔夫脱-哈特利法案》）和1979年的工会合同中的雇用条款的普遍性。结果强烈支持工会倾向于在高工作流失情况下控制招聘。

著录项

  • 作者

    Krishnan, Jayanthi.;

  • 作者单位

    The Ohio State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Ohio State University.;
  • 学科 Economic theory.;Labor relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1990
  • 页码 160 p.
  • 总页数 160
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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