Under both the common law and the civil law the corporation was seen as legal person in contrast to the human or "natural" person. The precise nature of this corporate personality has baffled European legal scholars since the time of the Roman republic. This dissertation first explores this problem as it manifested itself to Roman lawyers and later to their hiers, canon lawyers and Civilians. The authoritarian theory that corporations are legal fictions created by the state for its own purposes is contrasted with not only "individualist" school of thought where corporations are seen as basically another type of parternship but also the "Germanist" school of thought developed by nineteenth century German legal historians from ideas first enunciated by canon lawyers. These "Germanists" assumed that corporations were living, organic entities with rights of their own. Next, as attempts by common law judges and attorneys to deal with this elusive problem are explored, it will become apparent that the typologies developed by Continental scholars to describe the corporate entity were adapted by their Anglo-American counterparts.; After the discussion of the European background, attention will focus on attempts to structure or restructure the American business corporation along lines inspired by the various European models. The authoritarian dream of incorporation by the Federal government is examined from its origins in the Progressive era to the present day. Next, the effects of Otto von Gierke's organic theory of corporate personality on the American common law are detailed in a survey of the history of the shareholders' derivative suit focusing on the judicial response to the activities of Clarence Herbert Venner. Finally, the content of "corporate democracy" as a manifestation of "individualism" is explored in a study of the work of Lewis D. Gilbert.; The last chapter views corporations from the perspective of the political scientist. It demonstrates that the authoritarian view of corporations is usually associated with corporatism while "individualists" look toward different forms of syndicalism to emphasize the rights of coporate members. Between these two extremes are various schemes of people's capitalism and peoples' capitalism that attempt to achieve a synthesis.
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机译：根据普通法和大陆法，与人或“自然”人相比，公司被视为法人。自罗马共和国成立以来，这种法人资格的确切性质就使欧洲法律学者感到困惑。本文首先探讨了这一问题，这一问题在罗马律师中表现出来，后来又在他们的雇用者，典范律师和平民中表现出来。独裁主义理论认为公司是国家为自己目的而创建的法律小说，这不仅与“个人主义”学派（公司基本上被视为另一种类型的合伙制）形成鲜明对比，而且与十九世纪发展起来的“德国人”学派形成鲜明对比。德国法律历史学家从佳能律师最初阐明的思想中得出了结论。这些“德国主义者”认为公司是具有自身权利的生机勃勃的有机实体。其次，随着对普通法法官和律师为解决这一难以捉摸的问题而进行的尝试的探索，很明显，大陆学者为描述公司实体而开发的类型被其英美同行所采用。在讨论了欧洲背景之后，注意力将集中在按照各种欧洲模式的启发来构架或重组美国商业公司的尝试。联邦政府成立的专制主义梦想是从进步时代的起源到今天的。接下来，在对股东派生诉讼历史的调查中，重点关注对克拉伦斯·赫伯特·韦纳（Clarence Herbert Venner）活动的司法回应，详细介绍了奥托·冯·吉尔克（Otto von Gierke）的公司人格有机理论对美国普通法的影响。最后，在对刘易斯·吉尔伯特（Lewis D. Gilbert）著作的研究中，探索了作为“个人主义”体现的“企业民主”的内容。最后一章从政治学家的角度看待公司。它表明，公司的威权主义观点通常与社团主义有关，而“个人主义者”则以不同形式的集团主义来强调社团成员的权利。在这两个极端之间，存在着试图实现综合的各种人民资本主义和人民资本主义计划。
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